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Issue No. 193 - October 7 , 2000.
Contents :

       By Zoran Mamula

       By Sanja Vukcevic

       Slobodan Rackovic

       By Petruska Sustrova

5. Special addition: NEW AT TOL

FRY/Serbia: MILOSEVIC IN THE MUD:  An intreview with Zarko Korac
     By Zoran Mamula
     On Friday evening ( October 6) now former Yugoslav president
Slobodan Milosevic addressed the nation and complimented Kostunica
on his victory in the federal presidential elections, saying that
he would now turn to leading his party SPS (Serbian Socialist
party) and that, after ten years of government and numerous
obligations, he would now have more time for his family,
especially his grandson. It was a shock for most citizens of the
country who didn't think Milosevic would ever acknowledge his
defeat in public. However, he decided on this step only after he
exhausted all other methods of remaining in power. First he tried
to annul a landslide victory of Kostunica in the first round of
the elections with the help of the Federal election commission and the
Constitutional court, both loyal to him. After days of citizens'
protests and a general strike, he finally sent police to break up
demonstrations. However, on the 5th of October citizens prevailed
over the police, stormed the federal parliament and all
state-controlled media and proclaimed their victory. So most
Serbian analysts proved to be right when they said that Milosevic
cannot give up power peacefully. However, that is now in the past,
Kostunica is the new president and it is expected that a majority in
the federal government will be held by the parties that supported
his nomination. One of the leaders of the coalition alliance
Democratic opposition of Serbia (DOS) and president of
Socialdemocratic Union Zarko Korac speaks to STINA-NIJ about the
post-election crisis and new political relationships in the

    Q: Mr. Korac, to begin, please tell  us what your comment is
on Milosevic's address to the nation?

    A: It was pathetic behavior. At first, during the election
campaign, Milosevic was calling us "NATO servants, hyenas and
rats". Then he commanded the Federal election commission to register
132 000 imaginary votes from Kosovo, which was verified even by
the highest law institution in the country - the Federal
constitutional court. And finally, when we rebelled against the
election theft, he sent members of the special police to kill us all.
When all that failed, Milosevic with great reluctance
congratulated Kostunica on his election victory and said that now
he would have more time for his family and grandson. So after theft,
insults and assassination attempts all failed, only then can he
admit defeat. It is maybe the worst self-portrait I have ever seen
in my life. What is interesting is that Milosevic is now depending
on the mercy of the new president, a man whom he insulted and tried to
steal victory from with the help of the police. His future depends on
Kostunica's attitude and feeling for justice in order to prevent
Milosevic from further adventures. I think that it is impossible
and that sooner or later the former Yugoslav president will face
court trial and that he will be found responsible for all that he
did, since it is obvious that it was he who ordered the theft of votes
and the attempts to kill citizens in the streets of Belgrade.

    Q: How much has the visit of Russian foreign minister Igor
Ivanov influenced Milosevic to admit defeat and what do you think
about the role of Russia in the post-election crisis in FRY and
its rather indecisive standpoint, and even trying to persuade the opposition
to accept second round of presidential elections?

    A: I think that Russia finally saw that Milosevic was falling.
The new government in Moscow is much less inclined towards the type of
politicians as is Milosevic, and we shouldn't forget that there
are fewer Russian nationalists who are now sitting in their
parliament and who were traditionally favoring Milosevic. However,
Russia is caught in the middle between her desire to play the part of a
middle-man and huge frustration because it has turned into a
"wounded giant" and was an important force once. What exactly
Ivanov wanted isn't easy to say, except that he wanted to affirm
the role of Russia in the Balkans? It is interesting that Moscow
always insisted on being a middle-man, and the man who refused
Russian mediation was Slobodan Milosevic. He even refused Putin's
invitation addressed to him and Kostunica to come to Moscow,
although that invitation was degrading to opposition candidates
because it implied that second round of elections should have been
held, although it was already clear that Kostunica won in the
first round. Russia will pay the price of its inconstancy. It
seems that this visit was Ivanov's attempt to repair the damage
and the bad reputation Russia now has among Serbian citizens
because of the infamous role of Moscow during the post election
crisis. Finally, Kostunica himself said that Russia is always
making "one step forward then one step backward" which isn't a
compliment to Russian foreign policy.

    Q: How would you comment on the decisive protests on the 5th of
October; why on that day did such a "critical mass" of several hundred
thousand people gather in one place? There were so many talks
about this critical mass in the last ten years,  but there wasn't any
during the last demonstrations against Milosevic.

    A: Many history theories revolve around the issue of why
something happens at just that particular moment, and it is hard
to say what was decisive in this case, but there were no doubt
many reasons for revolution to happen on just that day. It is
important here to stress the fact that the Democratic opposition of
Serbia didn't become stronger when 19 parties united than those
parties were before, taken together. The decision to nominate
Kostunica was very good, but it doesn't mean there was something
magic in him crucial for victory. Our biggest success is that we
thought that the people wanted change. We participated in the
elections under very harsh conditions. Many told us to boycott
them. Most persistent were Vuk Draskovic, leader of the then biggest
opposition party Serbian reformist movement and leaders of the
ruling coalition in Montenegro, who had strong arguments in favor
of their decision since constitutional changes carried out without
them worsened the position of Montenegro in the federation. But,
we won because we made a good observation that the people have had enough of
misery, isolation and wars, that - simply put - they've had enough
of Milosevic. After the first round of elections we made another
good judgement. Many, not just Russians but also our friends from
the western countries, advised us to participate at the second
round of elections, saying that we would once again defeat
Milosevic. However, we knew that the people would defend their
will. We were certain that the citizens would physically fight the
police, many of them came armed to the rallies and if police
started to shoot there was a great danger of escalation in armed
conflict. The people were ready to defend their election votes at
any cost. So twice we evaluated the feelings of the people well.

    Q: Now it is certain that Kostunica is the president, but what
will the federal government be? Until now it seemed that
Milosevic's parties SPS and JUL, although they lost the election,
would manage to form a coalition government together with
the Montenegrin Socialist peoples party (SNS)  headed by Momir
Bulatovic. However, Milosevic in his address said that SPS will be
in opposition and it seems that SNP is also ready to co-operate
with the Democratic opposition of Serbia which was unimaginable

    A: That is now  key issue: whether to hurry and form the
government or wait for further collapse of the SPS, which hasn't made
any statement and the president of which is politically defeated.
We expect to form a government with the Montenegrin SNP. That would
enable us to carry out more active foreign and internal politics
and to regulate our relationship with Montenegro. We talked with the
Montenegrin ruling parties before the elections and decided to
incorporate their program for redefining relations within the
federation into ours. If we formed the federal government, we
could work on it, but the question is whether the SNP, in opposition
in Montenegro and a big opponent to politics of Montenegrin
president Milo Djukanovic, would want to participate in such
program. As a coalition which won the most seats in the federal
parliament we will demand urgent early elections in Serbia. We
have the right to ask it since we really achieved a great victory
and we expect Serbian election in 45 days, the shortest time
possible. So, there are many open issues and nothing is really

    Q: You mentioned relations with Montenegro. Now there are
conditions to repair that relationship, but Montenegrin president
Djukanovic said that official Podgorica won't accept a possible
coalition government made out of SNP and DOS. How can these
problems be resolved?

    A: There's no doubt that we will have to talk about it with
the ruling coalition in Montenegro. The SNP cannot decide what
the relations in the federation will be, that party represents only the 22
per cent of Montenegrin voters who participated in the federal
elections, while the rest listened to the government and boycotted the
elections. Serbia and Montenegro will probably have very loose
federal, almost confederate ties and that is the reality and
option Montenegro is entitled to. Of course, there is also the
issue of a referendum on independence. Regarding the constant threats
by the former Belgrade government to Montenegro, that must stop
immediately. My personal opinion is that the head of the Yugoslav army
Nebojsa Pavkovic and the federal defense minister Dragoljub Ojdanic
who threatened Montenegro have to leave their offices. They formed
the Seventh battalion and its soldiers, and this battalion I have personally
seen provoking Montenegrins by singing chetnic songs
as they walked down the streets of Podgorica with three fingers
raised in the air. They can be relieved of their offices by the
Supreme defense council and its session will be held very soon. That
council is now made out of Vojislav Kostunica, Milo Djukanovic and
Serbian president Milan Milutinovic. A majority of votes is enough
for change, and Kostunica can even himself decide and fire the
generals. I want to state this clearly: the new state and new army
administration will never again be a threat to Montenegro.

    Q: The last, but not the least important question in this
interview is the co-operation of FRY with the Hague Tribunal. During
the election campaign but also now that he is a president,
Vojislav Kostunica has said many times that the Hague Court is a political
and not a legal institution and that he would not hand over
Slobodan Milosevic and other officials accused of war crimes since
such a possibility is banned by the Serbian constitution. What do
you think about this issue?

    A: Mr. Kostunica can have such an attitude towards relations
with the Hague Tribunal as a party president. It is his right. But
as the Yugoslav president he will be very quickly facing
the obligations of the country towards the international community. If
he thinks that he can co-operate with the international community
and at the same time ignore the existence of the Hague Court which
was founded by the UN Security Council, and we want to keep our
seat in the UN, then he is wrong. Anybody who agrees with
Kostunica on that matter should best carefully look at Croatia
that also didn't want to co-operate with the Tribunal but had to
accept it in the end.

    By Sanja Vukcevic
    "Serbia made just the first of many steps towards democracy" This is
the observation of independent analytsts of the political situation in the
Balkans commenting on the post-election situation in Serbia.
At the same time they are expressing overt scepticism
towards the speed of the true democratic changes that should ensue
after the downfall of the ten-year old authoritarian regime headed by
Slobodan Milosevic.
    An American professor of social and political sciences and a
 highly regarded expert on the Balkans thinks that real normalization of
relationships between the countries in the region as well as the
true democratization of Serbia cannot happen until the Serbian people
realize that they have a "lion's share" burden of responsibility
for last wars on their backs and that the basis of the problem is
Serbian nationalism....
    " The last events in Serbia are cause for further optimism
that a turning point has come in the political culture, that the terror of
Slobodan Milosevic's government is at an end, but there are some
important "but's" there. One of them is that it is obvious that
the "love affair" of Serbs with Serbia isn't yet finished and that
Kostunica and a majority of the Serbian intelligentia and people still
think that Serbian nationalism, although in a milder form and
democratic appearance, is an acceptable road to democracy. I think
that a Serbia which doesn't see that Serbian nationalism is
the problem, not Milosevic, will have huge problems " - says Denic.

    Q.: Which are the first steps the new Yugoslav government will have
to take in order to start true democratization of the society?

    A: The steps necessary for the full democratization of Serbia are
the liberating of the main electronic media from state control. We
shall see very soon whether journalists are now able to carry on
their work in a professional manner. The second step is the depolitization
of the army and police forces, and a radical cut in their influence.
That process will be extremely painful in Serbia since those were
the only jobs that provided some at least some wages. The third
step is the formation of serious political parties with their own
distinct program that don't deal only with the issue of national
identity. This means complete restructuring of the Serbian political
scene with the Serbian reformist movement with their monarchist
program, Serbian radical party which still represents only a
movement, etc. Untill now they were all in the centre,
centre-right or at the right end so their program was based on
anti-left messages. I think that won't be enough for a Serbia that
is hungry, underemployed, full of miserable retired persons and
workers who don't receive their wages. We need to redefine the
poltical scene with a real, quality left. We must stress that it
was the strike of mine-workers in Kolubara that was the strongest
blow to the regime, it was the moment when the police gave up on
fighting the citizens. The same power is the power that will be
facing new Yugoslav authorities if they don't find an agreement
with the workers. And now the language of monarchy, nationalism
and merciless market isn't enough, waving three fingers in the air
cannot be the substitute to a political program.

    Q : Will Kostunica become a new  Serbian leader and can he
tackle those problems in the right way?

    A: I think Kostunica will be a transitionary figure since he
is no politician, but a rather rigid person, a lawyer and a
nationalist. At the same time he has around him a wide coalition
and that requires great political skill. He was almost the perfect
person to confront Milosevic since he himself was a mystery, but
now he will have to deal with specific political issues. That
calls for persons that will have a more specific policy. Serbian
political ideology was mostly centralistic, which is very
unsuitable for a situation which demands decentralized government
with toleration for differences. The problem with Kostunica is not
the fact that he labels himself as a Serbian nationalist, but rather
that he is also very centrally-inclined and he would be at loss
to offer the real solution for Montenegro, Kosovo, Voivodina and
Sandzak within the Yugoslavian frame. The solution cannot be
centralized without enormous pressure on the provinces.
Yugoslavia will be a truly federal state or non-existent. It is
the task of the Serbian democratic forces to live in a country with
regional differences that can be tollerated.
    One cannot see any note of self-criticism in the long and deep
interviews Kostunica gave. He assumed the role of a professor and
talked for hours about everything but the responsibility of Serbia and
Serbs for the regime that has been punishing them and their
neighbours for a decade. That can be seen by his attitude towards
the court in the Hague. One must say that this court isn't
"punishment" for Serbia, but the pressure to resolve the issue of
Serbian nationalism in the right way. The Serbian people have to
become aware that it wasn't Milosevic who voted for himself at the
elections, that Milosevic didn't kill any of the several
thousand dead Bosniaks in Srebrenica, that he didn't personally
torture any wounded Croats in Vukovar hospital. Such politics
first has to be condemned by its own people and then Serbia itself
should punish those who comitted war crimes.

    Q: Kostunica and Sernia expect soon the lifting of the sanctions
because of the democratic changes after the elections on 24th
September. Can the international community be so tolerant towards the
new but still nationalistic government in Belgrade?

    A: The international community should recognize Kostunica who
obviously won the elections, it should welcome new the Serbian
government and express hope that the new government will be
democratic and tolerant and then firmly and kindly set up the same
requests as those put up before Croatia as a condition to be
included in European integrations - change of attitude towards the
Hague court, freedom of the press and general democratization of
the society.

    Slobodan Rackovic
The winners of the Albanian local elections  held on the 1st of
October are the socialists, but the main victory goes to democracy
since everything went without an incident, for the first time
since this country emerged from a half century of communist
dictatorship ten years ago.
    Both the government representatives and numerous foreign monitors
claim that the local elections held in 309 municipalities and 65
Albanian towns last Sunday were the most regular and democratic
ever! If we take into account that almost all elections after the fall
of communism in Albanian (1991) turned into bloodbaths, then it is
clear that it becomes almost irrelevant who actually won. Of
course, Albania wouldn't be Albania as the Balkans wouldn't be the
Balkans if the defeated Democratic party led by former head of
state Sali Berisha didn't claim the elections were irregular, but it
cannot be ignored that there was not one incident at 5000 voting
posts, which was confirmed by numerous OSCE monitors. If we
compare these elections with parliamentary elections of 26th May
1996 or early elections of 31st June 1997, monitored by heavily
armed international military forces (during the action "Rainbow")
with dozens of killed and wounded - then it is not strange that
the international community is pleased that everything went
uncommonly quietly last Sunday. "This is the best proof that Albania
is slowly but confidently moving onto the European democratic stage.
Besides, isn't the fact that federal elections in neighbouring
Yugoslavia threaten to turn into civil war enough to confirm my
words?" - said Italian Giuseppe Caiaffa, one of the
international elections monitors in Albania. The international
community put million dollars in securing the regularity of the
    Returning to the election results, although there is still no
official confirmation, it is clear that the socialists, who
climbed to power in 1997 during the state of emergency which caused
many to doubt in their real power, have significantly grown in
popularity, winning in almost all major cities. Although there is
an important battle for local government in the second round on the 15th of
October, it is now certain that socialist candidates got 27 out of
65 mayoral offices, while the largest opposition Democratic party
won in only 9 cities. Out of 409 seats in city councils the Socialist
party got 110 of them in the first round. The Democratic party won 33
seats and other parties got only 3. Of course, these results were
published by the Socialist party newspaper "Zeri e populit", but the
results issued by foreign monitors are almost completely the same.
Opposition leader Sali Berisha first decided not to accept the
election results but later changed his decision (mostly due to
pressure from the international community). He claimed that 200
thousand out of 2 million and 750 thousand votes have disappeared,
mostly in the communities like some parts of Tirana traditionally
inclined towards his party. Yet, such unproved theses cannot ruin the
overall impression of the elections. For the time being there is
still no winner in the capital of Tirana, the city that quadrupled
in size in a short time (from 200 thousand to 800 thousand).
Socialist Edi Rama leads there with a significant margin over his
opponent and current mayor Besnik Mustafaj, a prominent member of the
opposition Democratic party, so it is almost certain that
socialists will get the upper hand in the capital for the first
time in ten years. A similar thing happened in the cities of Durres,
Vlora, Elbasan, Gjirocastr and other major towns, with the
exception of Skhodra which is still loyal to Berisha who was born
in that part of country.
    What elements influenced the victory of the Socialist party, the successor
to the communist Workers Party which was headed by dictator Enver
Hoxha who ruled for half a century (he died in 1986) - this is a
question asked by many local and foreign political analysts.
Primarily, the popularity of the young and energetic, but also extremely
tactful and tolerant prime minister Ilir Meta (32 years old) who
succeeded the similarly young and able Pandeli Majka last year.
Meta was the strongest argument of the Socialist party during the
election campaign. That young man, a former athlete, has in a short
time created exceptional results in foreign and internal
relations. By his policy of peaceful and active co-existence with
all countries, especially neighbours, with a radical move against
the idea of greater Albania and the consequent giving up of a patron
relationship with Kosovo, Prime Minister Meta brought about huge
popularity for his country in the eyes of the world, bringing an
important role for his small and economically backwards country in
the Stability Pact. In domestic affairs, he still didn't succeed
in creating a dialogue with the opposition and persuading it to
join parliament, government and other power institutions
(the opposition has been boycotting participation in power for 2
years, since the assassination of one of the Berisha's closest
colleagues, Azem Hajdari) but Meta managed to meet all their
requests via various progressive political reforms. He upgraded
and democraticized the Election Law, he rendered more liberal the Law
of information, decentralised the security service and cut down on
the huge hierarchy of the secret police. With the help of young party
colleagues (Pandeli Majko, Dr. Bashim Fino, Dr. Kastriot Islami
and others) he managed to blunt the edge of the conservative
communist wing within the Socialist party which is headed by the
charismatic Fatos Nano, still a party leader. The opposition was
pleased with what created in Albania an atmosphere of positive
political competition, which caused a relative normalisation of the
political situation in the always restless "country of the eagles".
There is yet more to be done in that sense, but the impression of
foreign monitors is that the era of chaos and anarchy, especially
characteristic of the period after the bloody civil unrest of Spring
1997 with 2,000 dead and 10,000 wounded is a history which will
never return. Crime, especially the smuggling of drugs, arms and
people is still in full swing, but law enforcement is more and more
successful in countering mafia. In such circumstances, foreign
investors are more interested in the country, which is making
Albania more attractive to foreign investors, although the economic
situation here is among the worst in Europe. On the other hand, the
opposition headed by Berisha's Democratic party, haven't yet
returned to the social and political life of the country, which can be
seen from the election results. It makes them losers of the fight for
prestige in Albania. The Democratic party needs reforms and new
leadership, similar to what happened in the Socialist party, so that
this once powerful and ruling party could return to its old glory. The
biggest shame is that there have been only two opposites on the
political scene in Albania for ten years - socialists and
democrats - so that the citizens don't have a third alternative
which would enrich Albanian politics and speeded up democratic
reforms in the country. Anyhow, the winners of the local elections -
socialists and Ilir Meta with his companions - have much more to
do in order to get Albania out of misery, primitivism and crime,
but victory at the local elections is giving a new  initiative to
the current Tirana government and makes it the main candidate for
winner in the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections to
be held in 9 months.
    By Petruska Sustrova
    The September weekends have been marked by demonstrations when
Austrian citizens blocked certain Austrian-Czech border crossing
points. The blockades were in protest against the planned
inauguration of the new Czech nuclear power station at Temelin,
only a few dozen kilometres from the Austrian border.  In Austria
the population held a referendum several years ago and decided
that nuclear energy would not be used in their country to generate
electricity.  For the sake of good neighbourly relations the
Austrians are nevertheless prepared to tolerate the nuclear power
stations which already exist on Czech and Slovak territory close
to their border (Dukovany in the Czech Republic and Jaslovske
Bohunice in Slovakia)  but they are firmly against the
commissioning of a new one.
    Temelin has a long history. Originally it was meant to be a
"great project of socialism" - its construction was decided by the
communist government in 1980.  The road from the decision to its
realization was long and tortunous under the communists, and so
the foundations for the power station  began to be laid in 1986,
in other words, in the year of the Ukrainian Chernobyl disaster.
The warning remained meaningless for the authorities at the time.
    The Temelin power station was to have four nuclear reactors;
it was planned that the first block  would start to generate power
in November 1992 and the whole construction was to be completed at
a cost of 52 thousand million crowns.  In November 1989 when the
communist regime collapsed in Czechoslovakia, two huge cooling
towers, rising above Temelin, could be seen for miles around.  But
at that time work on the reactors had not  begun since  the
technological equipment had not yet arrived from the Soviet Union.
A big protest demonstration was held in the summer of 1990 outside
the gates of the building site.
    The first Czechoslovak federal government decided to  reduce
the size of the power station (from four to two nuclear reactors),
but the Ministers felt that work had already progressed too far
and that already too much had been spent on the project so that it
was impossible to suspend it. Preliminary estimates revealed that
the further construction of Temelin would swallow a further 40
thousand million crowns.
    In the spring of 1992 the American firm Power International
prepared a  study  from which it resulted that the completion of
the Temelin power station would be much more expensive and that it
could well run into 120 thousand million (for the sake of
comparison: the annual budget of the Czech Republic is around 600
thousand million crowns).  Earlier on, immediately after the
unification of Germany, construction of the East German nuclear
power station Stendal, more or less of the same type as Temelin,
was suspended; its construction had reached approximately the same
stage as Temelin. The reason - too high estimated costs.
    The Czech government met in special session in June 1992 but
the Ministers did not adopt a proposed decision under which the
government would give its consent to the completion of the power
station.  The decision of whether or not to complete Temelin was
left to the next government which took over after the elections.
Although the new Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus could be heard
on several occasions claiming that a detailed study of Temelin
needed to be drawn up and that all pros and cons of the completion
would have to be considered, in September 1992 (the elections were
held in June) he signed a contract with the US Westinghouse firm
on the supply of a modern control system. The government approved
the contract in March 1993. Malicious  rumours claimed that Klaus
abandoned an analysis of the pros and cons of Temelin in September
1992 after his visit to Westinghouse in the US.
    The continuing building of the power station was something of
a tragicomedy: In the autumn of 1992 it was estimated that the
completion would cost 68.8 thousand million crowns and that it
would be finished by the end of 1995.   In November 1995 it was
estimated  that the first block of the Temelin power station would
be completed in September 1997 and that the cost of the whole
project would  be 76 thousand million crowns. That is how things
continued year after year - the completion date was being
postponed from one year to  the next and the cost continued to
rise.  As far back as 1992 when the completion of the project was
decided,  opponents of nuclear power and of the completion of the
Temelin power station pointed out that a combination of Russian
and American technology would be very expensive, that the cost of
completing the power station would reach 100-120 thousand million
crowns and that  the power station would not be finished before
the year 2000.  All this sounded f ening and none of the
politician wanted to listen.  Czech Prime Minister Klaus reacted
to all this at the time by arguing: "Questioning the project is
unfair". Environmentalists frequently demonstrated outside Temelin
but they were not able to arouse the interest of the government or
of the relevant authorities.
    Another source of scepticism surfaced towards the end of the
1990s: the Czech Republic did not need a further source of power,
at least not up to the year 2001.  The country is already
exporting electric power and selling it abroad for prices below
those charged at home.
    It became evident that environmentalists had been right in
their estimate of the time needed to build Temelin, as well as of
the  sum it would cost: the CEZ power company which owns the
Temelin power station, announced in the summer of 2000 that it was
about to start supplying fuel to the power station. By that time
the construction along with all investments had swallowed up
roughly 110 thousand million crowns.  In addition, the Czech state
had invested some 45 thousand million crowns in the
desulphurization of the thermal power stations in Northern
Bohemia. It was planned that these power stations, which are
devastating the environment, would be closed down once  Temelin
was commissioned.  But none of the powers-that-be today even
consider their closure: Northern Bohemia has a high rate of
unemployment as it is and the government is not prepared to risk
further problems with employees made redundant.
    It is obvious that the Czech opponents of Temelin will not
succeed in persuading the government to prevent the launching of
the power station.  Although in the spring of 2000  several tens
of thousands of people organized a signature campaign demanding a
referendum   which would deal with the question of launching
Temelin, Parliament ignored their petition.
    The very first autumn days made the entire project even more
problematic from the international point of view. The inauguration
of Temelin is the cause of protest not only by Austrian citizens
who Saturday after Saturday are blocking the border crossing
points, but even by Austrian politicians.  At the beginning of
September Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schussel suggested that if
Temelin was launched regardless of Austrian protests, Vienna could
well block the accession of the Czech Republic to the European
Union. The Austrian negotiators of Czech accession to the EU would
simply have to refuse to sign the chapter on energy. This in no
way  put Prague on the defensive: Czech Prime Minister Milos Zeman
declared that "the only response to Austrian threats can be
action" - in other words the speedy launching of the power
    The announced grandiose celebration of the inauguration of the
Temelin power station will not take place. The administrator of
the South Bohemian Hluboka castle refused to rent the castle
premises to the CEZ  company - he is worried about possible
protest demonstrations and about possible damage to be done to the
works of art in the castle.  CEZ consequently began to negotiate
about renting Cesky Krumlov castle, but in the end the
representatives of the  firm decided  to abandon plans for the
celebration. But the firm nevertheless insists on inaugurating
Temelin notwithstanding possible international complications which
the launching of the power station will bring for the Czech
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 (Free Access)
  Albania Passes Stability Test in Local Poll
  IMF/World Bank Summit Disrupted by Violence
  Polish President Unscathed by Campaign Mishaps
  Russia Plays Neutral Over Yugoslav Crisis
  Belarus Opposition Rally Meets with Calm Success
  Alleged Nazi War Criminal Dies before Conclusion of Trial
  Local Paper Decries "Purge" of Slovenian Defense Ministry
  Azeri President Alive, Surprised To Hear He Had Died
  Olympic Drug Scandal Angers Romanians
  Olympic Medal Roundup

    OUR TAKE: The Worm Is Turning
    Is Yugoslavia finally prepared to dump Milosevic?

   This month's "In Focus" package: Rotten To the Core
    There are many words for it: adulteration, debasement, decay,
defilement, distortion, falsification, putrefaction, rottenness.
Some are more harsh-sounding than others, but they all mean the
same thing--corruption--and the region is riddled with it from top
to bottom. While it is usual to define corruption in terms of
officialdom, in most cases, it is rooted deep in culture.
IN FOCUS: Willing Accomplices
Feature by Mykhaylo Gryshchenko
Free for One Week
    Corruption in Ukraine is a contagious illness that has
permeated the country's entire bureaucracy, not to mention its
people. The perception of Ukraine as a place where petty
corruption is rampant has gained acceptance among scholars,
journalists, and the wider public. Disclosures in the media, and
the personal experiences of Westerners and Easterners who have
dealt with Ukrainian officials at all bureaucratic levels have
contributed to the country's international notoriety.

    IN FOCUS: Debilitating Georgian Corruption
    Feature by Christoph Stefes
    Georgia has made some modest gains in its anti-corruption
drive by targeting the cause rather than the symptoms. But trying
to eradicate illicit activities with the iron fist of the law is a
pointless attempt, law enforcement bodies belong to the most
corrupt state agencies in Georgia. Further progress, however,
would require a sufficient number of incorruptible
officials--something in dangerously short supply.

    IN FOCUS: Might Makes Right
    Opinion by Brian Whitmore
    Free for One Week
    Earlier this year in Russia, machine-gun-toting riot police in
camouflage and ski masks stormed Guta-Bank, one of Moscow's
largest. Under the pretense of investigating the bank's finances,
the police smashed down a door, seized documents, and scared the
wits out of the bank's employees. Part of President Vladimir
Putin's campaign to stamp out corruption and establish a
"dictatorship of law" in Russia? Not quite. In contemporary
Russia, corruption allegations are dragged out for a number of
reasons, and none of them have anything to do with fighting

    IN FOCUS: Clans, Cotton, and Currency
    Opinion by Mikhail Degtiar
    Since medieval times, government positions in the Bukharian
Emirate were sold, rather than earned. After purchasing a post, an
official would discover that he then had to earn his living and
pay off his superiors by levying "extra" taxes and fines on the
people. This pyramid scheme of officialdom violated no moral norms
or laws whatsoever. Starting with cotton and ending with clans,
corruption has infiltrated the highest levels of government in
Uzbekistan--tradition wouldn't have it any other way.

    IN FOCUS: The Drawbacks of Exposing Corruption
    Feature by Rustam Temirov
    In May 1998, broadcast journalist Yashin Kurbanov ran two
stories critical of local authorities on prime-time news programs
on Jizzak television, a privately owned outlet in southern
Uzbekistan. Almost immediately after the programs were aired,
Kurbanov was fired. If it has to do with exposing corruption or
anything critical of the state, Uzbek journalists have learned to
let it go--one call from local authorities can put a journalist in
jail or out on the street.

    IN FOCUS: Not Toeing the Line
    Reportage by Marius Dragomir
    Over 300 journalists are still facing libel suits in Romania,
most of them for investigating corruption. With many newspapers
controlled by shady tycoons interested in tripping up their
rivals, journalists get plenty of practice following corruption
stories. But who journalists can investigate is strictly limited:
Reporters will often find themselves in hot water for following
the "wrong kind of story." Marius Dragomir--a former investigative
reporter for a regional newspaper, has had six libel suits filed
against him in the last five years--gives a first-hand account of
the trials and tribulations of investigating corruption.

    FEATURE: Licking Their Wounds
    by Luke Allnutt
    Free for One Week
    For anti-globalization protesters the imagery was stark and
irresistibly simple. Up in the fortress on the hill the IMF/World
Bank delegates wined, dined, and discussed the new world order,
protected by a black moat of police officers. Below, the
disaffected masses bayed: Rioters and residents choked on the tear
gas that hung low in the valley. In Prague, anti-globalization
protests turned from carnival to carnage.

    FEATURE: The Calm Before the Storm?
    by Dragan Stojkovic
    Free for One Week
    It's not over yet. But on 2 October, things did start to
change as the opposition set in motion a general strike. Thousands
turned out in a show of support for opposition candidate Vojislav
Kostunica's stated victory, truck and taxi drivers blockaded major
roads, and state-run media outlets renounced their loyalty to the
regime and called on their colleagues to do the same. Are the
people ready to see a general strike through to what may be a
bitter end?

    OPINION: The Cost of Blind Insistence
    by Mercedes Sprouse
    The words were written with presumed conviction: "[We] express
hope that your genius will allow the Lithuanian nation to
participate in your victorious crusade to destroy Judaism,
Bolshevism, and plutocracy." It was a self-proclaimed interim
government of Lithuania that expressed its "deepest gratitude" to
Adolf Hitler in 1941 for "saving the Lithuanian nation from
degradation." It was inevitable that these sentiments would one
day erupt with the political equivalent of a bomb. And explode
they did ahead of 8 October parliamentary elections, leaving Jews
enraged and observers perplexed.