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Issue No. 198. - November 10, 2000.
Contents :

       An Interview with Zoran Djindjic By Zoran Mamula

       By Radenko Udovicic

       By Ulvi Hakimov

       By Peter Mikes

5. Special addition: NEW AT TOL

    An Interview with Zoran Djindjic By Zoran Mamula
    The past two months have seen historical changes in
Yugoslavia. Vojislav Kostunica, candidate of the Democratic
Opposition of Serbia (DOS), a coalition of 18 parties, won the
presidential elections September 24, defeating Slobodan Milosevic,
who has ruled the country for 13 years. During his reign Milosevic
inflicted suffering on the citizens of Yugoslavia and neighboring
countries, and the Hague Tribunal indicted him for war crimes.
Milosevic refused to admit his defeat, so the opposition was
forced to defend its victory with large demonstrations October 5.
However, Yugoslavia is now in a controversial position. President
Kostunica and the new democratic government have made big gains on
the international front, but domestically the country faces a
disastrous energy crisis, a devastated economy and constant
strikes. Also, although the democrats are in power on the federal
level of FRY, the former regime is still in power in Serbia. Under
public pressure, Milosevic's socialists agreed to form a
provisional government with the DOS and to hold early elections in
Serbia on December 23, 2000. But the government is still not
functioning, since the socialists refuse to remove the chief of
secret police Rade Markovic from office. Opposition leaders
suspect that Markovic was behind numerous political
assassinations. One of the leaders of the  DOS and the president
of the Democratic Party Zoran Djindjic talks to NIJ about the
political situation in FRY and FRY's relationship with its
neighbors and with the international community.

    Q: What do you think about the period between the September 24
and today? On the one hand FRY has been accepted into all these
international organizations incredibly quickly, and on the other
there are many problems in Serbia, such as the serious lack of
electricity and the decline of production.

    A: Simply put, our work hasn't finished yet. We made a
necessary compromise, so there are both old and new forces in the
institutions, and they are fighting each other. There is an
obvious obstruction in the lower levels of the system which is
demonstrated by pettiness and anarchy, and possibly even some
sabotaging from the former regime, which are very difficult to
identify because they can look like normal breaks and failures. On
the other hand FRY has been very enthusiastically received in the
world and I am very glad that our country has at least taken
advantage of this chance and returned to where it was ten years
ago in just ten days. We all expected it to be longer, but it was
very short. Of course, one cannot live off global aid, and nobody
can help us if we don't help ourselves. That is, we must pay more
attention to this first crisis than to success on international
level. It would be even better if we could choose - we would opt
for quicker reforms in the country rather than its international
recognition. Members of the old regime are very hardy, especially
those in the secret service. Interest groups cling to power and
try to prevent any change. We can all see that after 15-20 days,
when we thought everything was over, there are new changes.
Remnants of the defeated forces worry us and show us that there is
much to be done before December 23, when Serbian elections will be

    Q: Were you surprised by the euphoric attitude of the
international community to the democratic revolution in
Yugoslavia? The attitude international community had towards
Yugoslavia for ten years changed in ten days.

    A: I was surprised, because October 5 brought a controlled
revolution, enthusiasm restrained by self-discipline, so that
everything ended only in some broken glass, and fires in the
parliament and state TV station. That was why the world's response
was so enthusiastic. We were lucky that everything went well,
because our image was so bad that our diplomats even expert ones,
would need years and years to persuade the world that we are not a
bunch of Slobodan Milosevic's but just normal people who were
living in an abnormal system. In this way, those normal people
clearly showed to the world what a blind person couldn't miss, nor
could cynics claim it was a setup. I congratulate the people; the
world how anyone would. When you saw the images on TV screens, you
could only take off your hat and say "bravo!"

    Q: FRY was accepted into the UN as a new member. Now there are
discussions about following that with countries who were members
of the former SFRY. What will FRY advocate during negotiations?

    A: Things are very clear: the whole world has accepted that
this Yugoslavia of ours is not Tito's Yugoslavia, nor the country
from 1918, but a different country that can accept the continuity
in name only, and the political system and national anthem only
should it choose to do so. Everything else has essentially gone
with the other republics and is similar to a divorce process. All
the property you put together into your marriage is divided by the
court when you separate from each other. That unpleasant process
is now awaiting us, too. I am sorry it came eight years too late.
It would have been better for us to have done it then, and we
would have forgotten it by now. There are certain criteria
regarding how the debt of the former country will be spread over
new republics, along with the division of its property. All the
stories about how we will pay war reparations because we accepted
FRY as a new country is nonsense, because reparations could be
possible only if we also inherite a former country's
responsibility for the wars it led. The wars weren't waged by the
army of the present Yugoslavia but of Milosevic. We, too, can ask
for reparations because our boys were mobilized into that army and
lost their lives. The only question is who can pay it now, since
that Yugoslavia doesn't exist anymore. Measurements are known
relating to the numbers of citizens and the sizes of the
countries. I think our part in it all has already been calculated.
There's no doubt there will be a lot of hassle, and I think that
we need to vehemently protect our interests in order to get the
maximum out of it. We need to hire good international experts who
will protect our financial interest in this division of debts and

    Q: Relations between FRY and Croatia are burdened by many ugly
things, especially four years of bloody war between these two
nations. After the war diplomatic relations were established
between Belgrade and Zagreb, but they were far from normal. What
stand will the new government in Belgrade take towards Zagreb?

    A: Relations must be normalized in the interest of individual
citizens. Between 200 and 300 thousand Serbs exiled from Croatia
are now living in Serbia. They have the right to their pensions,
apartments, etc. On the other hand, there are 80 thousand Croats
living mostly in Voivodina, and they also want normalization and
the possibility of crossing the borders without problems. I am in
favor of a quick normalization of relations, but always in the
interest if make life easier for the people. Not for reasons of
state, but primarily so that individuals don't suffer because
their governments cannot come to an agreement. The state exists
for its citizens, and not vice versa. Unfortunately, for a long
time it wasn't like this, so now things should be put where they
belong. In the name of 300 thousand Serbs, we must reach out and
establish normal contacts with Croatian government and find a
solution with the help of international organizations. Those Serbs
will either get compensation for ir property or will have their
problem solved in some other way.

    Q: What about political and economic cooperation between FRY
and Croatia?

    A: To the extent that is suitable for both of our countries.
It is up to economists to decide--our job is to render business in
the Balkans easier, not only with Croatia but also with other
Balkan countries, and to strive towards a milder variant of a
border union like that practiced by the European Union. It would
be stupid for the Balkan region, which has been united for
centuries, to divide itself because of the latest crises and to
cut off its traffic and economic ties, which causes more expenses
in production. Regarding political relations, the issue of
refugees is the central subject that has been linking our
countries. On the other hand, the Stability Pact and various other
regional institutions are places where we will meet each other and
maybe discuss some mutual projects like highways, gas lines,
telecommunications and others that are only worth doing on a
regional level as part of a global plan. We are certain that our
interest is to go through Croatia towards Austria, which is how
traffic was before the war. If we wanted to go to the West, we
traveled by highway through Zagreb. I think that line needs to be
opened again and we will do all political steps to make that
communications open in an economical sense.

    Q: Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal has been a painful
issue for Yugoslavia. FRY president Vojislav Kostunica said that
the constitution didn't allow extradition of Yugoslav citizens to
a foreign country and that he wouldn't extradite anyone to the
Hague. On the other hand, he announced the opening of the Hague
Tribunal's office in Belgrade. Also, the federal prime minister
Zoran Zizic said that cooperation with the Hague Court wasn't a
priority of the government. What should be the attitude of the
Yugoslav government towards the Tribunal?

    A: Whether the issue of extraditing those accused of war
crimes to the Hague will be resolved depends on how the majority
in the federal parliament feels about it. The procedure of
constitutional changes is well known, and I think it requires a
different parliament than the one now. Maybe this issue will be
resolved in a year, in a different way. For now, there isn't any
constitutional basis for extraditing our citizens. On the other
hand, Slobodan Milosevic himself bound FRY to cooperation with the
Hague after he signed the Dayton Accords, and there is no
maneuvering space. We must respect international contracts signed
by the previous government. I think there are some temporary
solutions such as joint research commissions which would prepare
the material and immediately show to what extent some Hague
indictments are really well grounded. Also, one might see how we
as a country have our interest in putting to trial some persons
for what they did and having them serve their senten here. If it
could be arranged with some kind of Hague monitoring, then we
might reach a compromise.

    Q: Does that mean Slobodan Milosevic could be brought to trial
in FRY?

    A: He and all who will be found guilty of crimes against

    Q: Relations within the federation, between Serbia and
Montenegro, didn't improve much even after defeat of Slobodan
Milosevic, who was the main unbalancing factor in the
relationship. The ruling coalition in Montenegro, the country that
boycotted the federal elections, want in their new platform that
both Serbia and Montenegro become internationally recognized
countries and only then to form a new alliance, with just a
symbollic number of joint institutions. However, the Montenegrin
government recently postponed the issue of a referendum until June
2001 so that it could initiate negotiations about mutual relations
with new Serbian authorities in December this year. What is your
vision of the future relationship with Montenegro?

    A: think we went through the main crisis by postponing a
referendum until June 2001. We will define a concept acceptable to
both parties. The concept is the preservation of joint country,
but with more independence of both members than before. De facto
it is a loose federation, but formally it is just the opposite. We
need to lay out a loose federation that will function as such. It
will in effect have more authority than the present one, but will
be formally less strict than it is today. It is time to finally
resolve this schizophrenia of our country - much authority in
writing, but none in reality. What is written in constitution
should finally be put into practice. It doesn't have to be a big
number of joint institutions - just the army, foreign policy,
customs. I am certain that we will make such an arrangement with

    By Radenko Udovicic
    On the eve of general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina on
November 11th, the political situation seems completely stable,
which is surprising, considering the significance of the elections
and the events over the past month-- important political
developments and deep disagreements between national
representatives regarding the future of the country. All political
parties have implored citizens to participate in the election and
to elect "those that will represent them best". Of course, each
party sees itself as such.
    The main political party of Bosnian Croats - HDZ - along with
some minor Croatian parties will hold a Croatian referendum for
the election day regarding their constitutional status and what
changes are needed to gain equality for Croats in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The referendum was motivated by the extreme
displeasure caused by a decision taken by the Temporary Eection
Commission (PIK), headed by OSCE. This decision changed how
representatives to the House of Nations of both federal and state
parliaments would be elected. Essentially, the decision means that
from now on representatives of the various cantons' assemblies in
the Federation will elect national representatives to the House of
Nations, where crucial issues are resolved by consensus. HDZ
favors only Croats choosing Croats, Bosniaks choosing Bosniaks,
etc. HDZ is unhappy because it assumes Bosniaks will vote for
those "do not have Croatian interests in mind." HDZ includes in
this category all Croats possessing less rigid onalistic attitudes
than their own--mostly members of multi-ethnic parties.
    But more dangerous than discontent over an election rule is
the long-hidden Croatian wish for a third, Croatian entity. The
demand for a special Croatian entity was indirectly incorporated
into the referendum. The international community and all other
parties in the B-H Federation have said it is extremely dangerous
to open this issue for debate, since it would mean a unilateral
change of the Dayton Accord.
    Regarding Bosniaks, a battle is expected between the only two
parties at the general and cantonal elections this November -the
ruling Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and the opposition
Social-democrat Party (SDP), which won in almost all cities of the
Bosniak division of the Federation at the spring local elections,
and thus gained new momentum. That victory was the first major
political change in Federation B-H in ten years, especially among
Bosniaks, since SDA had previously been indisputable. However,
gaining power in important counties is only the first phase of
political ascendance. The SDP and many local analysts think that
November is the time for the next step, which if successful would
definitely remove SDA from power.
    The once fairly strong Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina has
now been at marginalized, mostly because of the political
indecisiveness of its president Haris Silajdzic. During the last
general elections the party formed a coalition with the SDA, but
came out independent in the local elections in some counties. Its
success was far below expected, but thanks to later coalitions
with SDA and SDP it participates in the government in certain
regions. Haris Silajdzic supports changing the Dayton Accords,
drawing on the support of some Bosniaks who find the agreement
unfair, dysfunctional; and contrary to Bosniak national interests.
However, experts are not predicting much support for the Party for
B-H, since the upcoming elections are considered to be crucial in
deciding whether the present regime will stand or topple. It is
estimated that those support the present government, which
includes the Party for B-H, will vote for SDA, while those
favoring the opposition will turn to SDP.
    In the Serb Republic, the second Bosnian entity, forecasters
favor the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), which had to step down
two years ago but is now moving toward sure success thanks to
reorganization and younger leaders. This is a nationalist party
founded by Radovan Karadzic, an indicted war criminal. It would
seem, though, that he no longer influences the SDS, since the
party dismissed some of its more extreme aims, such as full
independence for the Serb Republic or its annexation to Serbia.
    The international community probably knows SDS will come out a
winner. It is likely trying to establish closer ties with the more
cooperative leaders of that party, in order to influence the SDS
to adopt a more flexible attitude toward the concept of B-H as a
functioning country of three different nations. Two such leaders
are the SDS candidate for the presidency Mirko Sarovic and
vice-president of the Serb Republic Dragan Cavic. Both men are on
relatively good terms with the international community and have a
clean record regarding war crimes and other criminal actions.
Another serious rival for the presidential office is Milorad
Dodik, the present prime minister of the Serb Republic. However,
analysts say Dodik, who enjoys the complete support of
international community, will leave politics. This politician, who
opened the Serb Republic to the world and attracted many foreign
donations, did not manage to root out the nation's corruption, nor
could he unify Bosnian Serbs. Many acc him of allowing his hunger
for power to foster uncooperative and hostile relations with the
    There is also a new party in the Serb Republic - Party of
Democratic Progress (PDP) - that should be remarkably successful.
PDP president Mladen Ivanic is a pre-war communist politician, and
currently works as a professor at the University of Banja Luka.
Ivanic is a moderate politician occupies the middle ground between
the pro-western sentiments of the present government and prime
minister Dodik and the hard-line opposition led by SDS. Ivanic's
good relations with international officials and enviable intellect
have attracted many reasonable people and have gained his party
majority support in some communities. This is especially relevant
for Banja Luka, which is the biggest metropolitan center of the
Serb Republic, but the PDP, also, demonstrated at local elections
this spring that it can count on certain support in the east,
which traditionally leans towards SDS. SDP is expected to become
the strongest party, with 14 seats in the 42-seat federal
parliament, according to the most recent poll conducted by the US
National Democratic Institute, the only organization that
researches Bosnian voter sentiment. After the SDP comes SDS and
SDA with 6 seats each, and then HDZ and Party for B-H with 4 seats
    In the Federation Parliament, SDP is predicted to win an
exceptional 57 seats, SDA 26, and HDZ 19. The strongest party in
the Serb Republic's parliament should be SDS with 35 seats, then
Dodik's SNSD with 18, and Ivanic's PDP with 17. If these
predictions turn out to be accurate, Ivanic's and Dodik's parties
will have a combined 35 seats, equal to the SDS, so that minor
parties could prove crucial in the fight to gain the upper hand in
the parliament and form the government. Two days before the B-H
elections Helsinki Watch said the election campaign was "as dirty
as ever," because politicians resorted to strong words to
discredit their rivals. Also, this organization said some parties
led an anti-Dayton campaign, which has significantly increased
political tensions in the country. Helsinki Watch named HDZ and
SDS as parties advocating separatism, especially in speeches made
by their low-level officials, as well as the Party for B-H and
Bosnian Patriotic Party, who called for disbanding the separate
entities and creating unified Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since these
parties all play prominent roles in Bosnian politics, it is clear
why elections are being aniticipated with so much fear. The
opposing attitudes of the parties who are in favor of redefining
Dayton Accord are extremely dangerous for the future of B-H. If
such parties succeed at the elections, Bosnia will find itself
unable to survive without the protection of the international
community. This woul d be tragic, especially now that the region
is no longer ruled by nationalists hostile towards Bosnia.
    By Ulvi Hakimov
    A new black page has opened in the history of elections in
Azerbaijan. The parliamentary elections held November 5, 2000
were falsified, and misrepresent the nation's will. The guilty
parties in these irregularities are the Central Election Committee
(CEC), the ruling New Azerbaijan Party (NAP), and Heidar Aliev,
who overturned the democratically elected president Abulfaz
Elchibey in a 1993 coup. Why would government officials falsify
the elections? The answer is simple. Azerbaijanis voted against
the NAP, headed by the Aliev clan and the artificial opposition
they created, and instead chose the Musavat Party, representing
the democratic opposition.
    Violations in the November 5 elections were many and varied.
The international observation mission encountered irregularities
that even they, in their many years of experience, had never seen.
The automated information center and the state-owned television
station AZTV1 played starring roles in rigging the elections.
These bodies gave falsified results from the District and
Territorial Election Commissions. First, AZTV1 doubled the
turnouts reported by the voting districts. Only 25 to 30 percent
of voters came to the polls, according to international and local
observers, as well as representatives of the opposition on the
election commissions. The last several hundred reports released by
the 5,000 election stations not facing charges of falsification
confirm these numbers. If this is the case, AZTV1 and the CEC's
claims that the elections drew a 70% voter turnout are completely
absurd. The chairmen of several district election commissions even
presented written and stamped documents to the candidates stating
they had not given any such information to the AZTV1 and CEC. Four
hundred four (404) candidates out of 1,008 in 99 one-term election
districts have been registered. More than 600 independent and
opposition candidates representing nearly 1,200,000 signatures
have been barred from registering. Most of these are favored
candidates--opposition leaders, well-known intellectuals and
public figures. Nearly 300 of the 404 candidates registered were
members of the NAP and its supporters. Thirty candidates from the
democratic opposition [12 from the Popular Front-Elchibey's
supporters, 18 from the Musavat Party] have been registered.
    The candidates from the democratic opposition won the
elections with 60% of the vote; hundreds of election commission
reports confirm this. But there are now two kinds of reports:
those pre-prepared by the authorities, which have not been signed
by opposition commission members, and the reports--numbering in
the hundreds--that all members have signed. The state story
challenges all logic: the three candidates from the democratic
opposition that authorities allowed to be elected reportedly
collected 60-70% of voices, while the parties they represent
allegedly drew only 4 to 5% of the constituency in their
districts. The NAP, on the other hand, supposedly gained 60-70% of
the votes in these districts. These results certainly seem rather
    Twelve political parties and one election bloc were fighting
for 25 seats under the proportional election system. Observers
predicted that the primary struggle would be seen between four
political parties that could exceed the 6 percent barrier: the
Musavat Party representing the democratic opposition, the ruling
NAP, and the conservative National Independence and Democratic
parties. This indeed was the case. Musavat carried the victory,
according to international and local observers, opposition and
independent representatives at the election commissions, and the
final reports of over 1,000 election results not facing charges.
These final results give Musavat 45 to 50 percent of the vote, NAP
20 to 25 percent, NIP 10 to 15 percent, and ADP 6 to 10 percent.
The "Yurd" faction, which participated in the elections under the
name "The Popular Front," and its leader Ali Kerimov, just barely
exceeded the 6-percent barrier and collected about 2 to 5 percent
of the vote. But the falsifications are so exteme that according to
the CEC's November 7 report, the NAP gathered 70.83 percent, the
Popular Front ["Yurd" wing] 6.4 percent, Musavat 4.71 percent, NIP
3.88 percent, and ADP 1.20 percent. These figures hardly need
    In all election commissions, one secretary and one other
representative were from the opposition, and at first first
glance, this should be estimated as progress in comparison with
the 1995 parliamentary elections. But two-thirds of the election
commissions are under government influence, and caused the
falsification of the elections in favor of the NAP. This election
introduced one unprecedented crime. The directors of the schools
housing election stations (3 or 4 election stations per school]
were unofficially answerable to the election commissions in giving
instructions. Under their orders, additional ballot boxes were
taken from the polling stations under the pretense of taking them
to shut-ins and the elderly, and were brought back filled with
ballots. Neither international nor local observers were allowed be
present at the polling stations by the school directors' orders
and the orders of the election commission chairmen. They were also
barred from observing the process of counting votes. The directors
enlisted the police to expel any opposition election commission
members from polling stations once the polls closed, denying their
access to counting process, and then falsifying the results. After
the ballots were counted, the non-opposition members of the
election commissions, afraid of the peoples' response to the
results, fled to or were escorted to local government headquarters
and police departments. The commission members refused to give the
election reports to the international and local observers, and
representatives of the parties or candidates, a flagrant violation
of the law. In some regions ( e.g., Barda and Karabakh) the
electricity was cut off just after the polls closed, and the
results were subsequentally rigged entirely. Curiously, the
electricity was cut off in these regions only at the polling
stations. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) played the main
role in falsifying the elections. At 18:30 on election day, half
an hour before the polls closed, police and other unknown persons
attacked district election stations, barring international and
local observers, and independent and opposition commission members
from the counting process, and in many instances expelling them
from the election stations. This action seemed to occur with
government blessing. Hundreds of representatives of parties and
independent candidates, candidates' lawyers, and even the
candidates themselves were detained or arrested. And this
unpublicised incident in the Salyan region: an official arrived at
Election District 37 from the MIA Department to Fight Against
Organized Crime and Terrorism and its chief Sevindik Safarov, and
tried to change the election results. Chairmen of several
divisions of election districts were kidnapped by the police or
taken to police stations. But even physical pressure and police
harassment could not break the will of the nation. The
international observation mission recognized the November 5
parliamentary elections as progress. But they have also asserted
that the process was extremely irregular and hopelessly rigged. It
is impossible to hide one truth, though; the fact that the
elections took place represents the nation's resistance, and this
resistance still continues. The nation voted against the Aliev
government. This government should leave power and will no doubt
eventually do so. The victory of the democratic opposition in
these elections is an indicator that the Azerbaijani nation
continues its struggle for democracy and remains faithful to
Elchibey and to democracy. If the elections had been free, fair,
and democratic, we would now be congratulating the representatives
of the democratic opposition--the Musavat Party. The final result
is that the results of these rigged parliamentary elections should
be thrown out; new elections must be held in Azerbaijan under the
control of the civilized world. Otherwise, there will be two
parliaments, two presidents, and other "two's" in Azerbaijan, with
only the wish of someday being one.
    By Peter Mikes
    Slovakia will hold a referendum for early elections, but its
results may not be recognized.
    The Constitutional Court announced Tuesday that it will not
comply with a request from Slovakian MPs to stop the Slovakian
early-election referendum. The referendum will therefore be held
November 11 as planned. But the efforts of former prime minister
Vladimir Meciar and his HZDS party (Movement for a Democratic
Slovakia) may meet with similar failure. The latest forecasts
predict that the referendum will attract only 37 percent of
eligible voters, 13 percentage points shy of the 50 percent needed
to be valid.
    Meciar has devoted himself to the referendum's success. He has
attacked his former rival, the Slovak National Party (SNS), which
has been losing support since it vetoed Slovakia's entry into
NATO. Meciar hoped this would attract support for the referendum
from SMER. SMER is a new political party which has drawn 15
percent of voter support, mostly young people who want Slovakia to
join NATO. Meciar also announced he would decline the prime
ministership of the next government even if HZDS won the election.
This move dangles a carrot in front of SMER and SDL (Party of the
Democratic Left). These parties oppose a coalition with HZDS, but
only because of Meciar; if Meciar were to step down, they might
consider joining forces with his party. But despite these efforts
neither SMER nor SDL encouraged their voters to participate in the
referendum. Probably only HZDS supporters will vote November 11,
since the governmental coalition parties have also announced their
    If the referendum were to attract the necessary percentage of
voters and passed, Slovakian parliamentary elections could be held
within the next 6 months. Meciar might regain power in these
elections due to massive losses sustained by the governmental
    But it's more likely that insufficient voter participation
will render the referendum invalid, at which point Meciar's own
party may attack him for organizing yet another failed effort
since losing the 1998 elections. If the referendum fails, the
Slovakian parliamentary elections will be scheduled for 2002.
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 (Free Access)
  Albania's Electricity Crisis Gets Worse
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OUR TAKE: Sleepless in Strasbourg On Azerbaijan and the Council of Europe

SPECIAL REPORT: Yugoslavia After the Fireworks
Taking Matters Into Their Own Hands
    Feature by Dragan Stojkovic and Elizabeth Chung
    For nearly three years, she appeared on Belgrade television
screens, delivering the news, or rather the rhetoric of the former
regime. Her face was one of the Yugoslav capital's more visible
and her voice a recognizable one. But things have changed.
Bozana--a former Studio B anchorwoman--says that her career after
the revolution is now in limbo. As the dust settles after
Yugoslavia's revolution, the opportunists and turncoats are coming
out of the woodwork

DOS Version 2.0, In Serbian
    Analysis by Christian A. Nielsen
    One month after the "October Revolution" people are breathing
more easily in Serbia. Yet, as so often before, uncertainty stands
as the only constant in a difficult and enigmatic equation. This
state of affairs seems certain to persist at least until
republican elections are held in December.

Experience, the Tie That Binds
    Opinion by Balazs Jarabik
    Never has there been a more opportune time for Central and
Eastern Europe to step in and share its newly found democratic
wealth with Yugoslavia. Serbs are suspicious of everything Western
and everything American, even the idea of democracy itself--and
not just as a result of the NATO bombings last year.

FEATURE: The Mother of Manipulated Elections
    by Seymur Selimov
    President Heydar Aliev's ruling party, New Azerbaijan swept to
a massive victory in 5 November parliamentary elections, and paved
the way for a transfer of power from father to son. But it was a
poll that could mean much more than the simple selection of a new
crop of government deputies. International observers and local
opposition parties claimed vast irregularities, throwing into
doubt the oil-rich country's possible membership in the Council of

COMMENTARY: Bosnia's Withering Radicalism
   by Daria Sito with Tihomir Loza
   Western officials implementing Bosnia's peace process hope
that upcoming general elections will be another sign that the
country is moving away from extreme politics and will break the
decade-long nationalist grip on power. In light of democratic
changes that took place earlier this year in neighboring Croatia
and Yugoslavia, some say the rug has been pulled from under the
three dominant nationalist parties' feet.

MEDIA: Journalist or Mercenary With a Pen?
    by Kristina Valentova
    Critics and admirers discuss whether Slovakia's high-profile
journalist, Stefan Hrib, is a true defender of journalistic faith
or a politically motivated hack. Whatever the case, both Hrib and
his weekly, Domino Forum, have made a big splash in Slovak media,
crashing parties and taking names.