Issue No. 229 - July 4, 2001

           By Zoran Mamula

          By Zvezdan Georgievski

3. Bosnia and Herzegovina: ANOTHER LOST RACE FOR EUROPE
         By Radenko Udovcic

        By Paulyuk Bykowski

5. Special addition: NEW AT TOL

     By Zoran Mamula
  Extradition of the former Yugoslav president Slobodan
Milosevic to the Hague Court, especially the speed of his sending
to Holland, despite ban of federal constitutional court on that
action, has delighted all key actors of the international community,
but also caused huge turbulence in Yugoslavian politics.
    Only one day after Milosevic found himself in Shevingen jail,
Yugoslav prime minister Zoran Zizic resigned together with all
ministers from his party - Socialist People's Party of Montenegro
(SNP). This party, which prevented passing of the law which would
have enabled official cooperation with the Hague court since it
opposed extradition of Yugoslav citizens to that court, has
accused its coalition partners in Serbia - DOS that they didn't
respect constitution when they extradited Milosevic because
federal constitutional court blocked government's decision to
cooperate with Hague. After that, there was no hope for the
federal coalition and the government has fallen. No  smaller
crisis came up in DOS itself. Yugoslav president Vojislav
Kostunica who is also leader of Democratic Party of Serbia, the
strongest party within DOS, accused his main rival Serbian prime
minister Zoran Djindjic that he "humiliated the state and put into
question the survival of Yugoslavia when he illegally indited
Milosevic". Djindjic just said that Belgrade had to fulfill its
international obligations and characterized constitutional court
as "illegitimate partisan institution formed by Slobodan
Milosevic". Most public controversy was caused by Kostunica's
statement that he found out about Milosevic's extradition only
when former president was well on his way to Hague. Djindjic
retorted him saying that ministers from Democratic Serbian Party
could have informed him about everything since they were present
at the government session which came out with the final decision.
High political tensions further escalated with days-long protests
of Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and Serbian Radical
Party led by ultra-nationalist Vojislav Seselj. However, it is
obvious that they cannot draw upon more than 10,000 people and
that their power is only a shadow of the one they had when in
power. Also, one shouldn't forget that after "democratic
revolution" in October there simply aren't enough people ready to
demonstrate for Milosevic.
    Whoever is engaged in politics in any way will now, after
expedient send of Slobodan Milosevic to Hague, ask completely
logical question - what will happen in the FRY and Serbia next.
The fact is that Djindjic won the first round in his fight with
the strongest rival, coalition partner Vojislav Kostunica. All
DOS members apart from DSS stood by him which gives him a moral
satisfaction, but doesn't reduce the risk of another
complications, perhaps even break-apart, in this wide, and already
fighting coalition. Djindjic undoubtedly made a brave, gambling
move. Now its Kostunica's move.
    DSS leader and Yugoslav president, Kostunica saw government's
decision to extradite Milosevic as a certain blow to his
legalistic course of action and a challenge which will, without
doubts, speed up already initiated process of internal
reorganization and division of DOS. Kostunica said that
government's decision was irresponsible and quick, an attack on
the rule of law and constitutional order, but he sustained from
announcing possible countermeasures.
    His address to keep peace in country and continue cooperation
with the world could be interpreted as "easing of tensions", but
also as a tactical maneuver before the strongest party in DOS
comes out with its plan of action, without losing current
position: DSS must keep up the coalition intact at least until the
end of year in order to reach agreement with Montenegrin partners
about future relations or extend distancing from the most part of
DOS and search for new allies.
    One thing is certain. Even if the leaders of Kostunica's party
restrained themselves from some radical moves, there are threats
coming from the other side, from Montenegro. SNP claims that it
will never again join coalition with DOS. If that is their final
words, then the joint country of Serbia and Montenegro now faces
its biggest temptation; perhaps even its bare survival is in
question. Last Sunday president Kostunica started consulting with
party representatives about the formation of "expert government"
with some other parties apart from SNP and DOS. However, it is
uncertain point whether agreement will finally be made because of
sudden great animosity among former coalition partners.
    The alternative is early federal elections, but anyone with
political clout knows that situation in Serbia and Montenegro
simply doesn't allow for such exit from Yugoslav crisis. DOS
doesn't want early elections because it couldn't form a joint list
because of internal struggles. Therefore, its victory isn't
    Regarding Montenegro, situation wouldn't change much from the
last elections, since party of Montenegrin president Milo
Djukanovic would once again boycott the elections since it doesn't
recognize the federal state.
    SNP attitude is basically hypocritical: it doesn't want to
cooperate with Djindjic and majority in DOS, wants closer ties
with Kostunica and Democratic Serbian Party and assures the public
that the survival of joint state remains its main priority. At the
same time, it rejects coalition with former partners in the federal
parliament, SPS and radical party. Who manages to decipher SNP's
true intentions from this political broil, a magic formula of what
is going to happen with Yugoslav government and the FRY itself in
the next ten days certainly deserves a recognition. However, one
should be careful and wait for further moves of all participants
in the newest political and state crisis and then say whether
Yugoslavia will survive and in what form.

                          * * *

     By Zvezdan Georgievski
   It seems that since the last White House's decision, meaning
order, to ban all future financial transactions with Albanian
extremists and their entrance into the country as well as lists of
people against whom these decisions were made is dramatically
changing the situation in Macedonia as well as force balance in
the field. Americans proved their determination by sending their
special envoy James Pardew who told both parties that the conflict
between Macedonians and Albanians cannot be resolved with military
    These American decisions could mean the end of Macedonian war.
Clear message of George Bush Jr. has shrank political and
realistic capacities of Macedonian KLA for war waging to a
minimum. For political representatives of Albanians in Macedonia
such harshly intoned message can be compared to a situation when
one is moved from a cozy beach chair into a large refrigerator -
shaking like a mouse. On the other hand, the message from
Washington came together with remarks of the constitutional expert
Robert Badinter, sent to Macedonia on American behalf. He said
that consensual democracy was a crazy idea, that the Macedonian
constitution was one of the most democratic in Europe and that
possible changes could be implemented through local government...
    So, why then this war?
    Publishing of the list of famous persons from Macedonian KLA
didn't surprise Macedonian public. One might rather say that it
surprised the KLA itself. On the list are names of leaders and
commanders of Kosovar protection corps (civil police of Kosovar
Albanians founded when international forces came into Kosovo, the
aim of which was to help disarm Kosovo Liberation Army) which
speaks volumes about decisiveness of current American
administration to deal with some legacy of Bill Clinton in Kosovo.
Kosovar protection corps was baby and favorite of Clinton's
administration, but now team of George Bush recognizes region
troublemakers in some relevant persons from that organization.
    Washington decisions clearly identify logistic and political
centers of Macedonian war to be in Kosovo and therefore indirectly
recognize that war in Macedonia is being lead under pressure from
Kosovo. In other words, it means the end to all talk about the
"final act" of Yugoslav break-apart, about the need to change
borders, about the controlled chaos so that the USA could control
the area between Adriatic and Caspian sea, that the USA are
"natural" Albanian allies and that EU and USA are
"anti-Macedonian"...  It seems that those who were saying from
the start that it was all about attempt of extremists to win part
of the territory with terror and change democratic constitution
of the country. Washington message also carries great importance
for the change in European politics towards Macedonia that has
often been marked by disorientation and misunderstanding of roots
and characteristics of the conflict in Macedonia. With its decision,
Washington also sets the boundaries for mission of a new
representative in Skopje Francois Leotard, former French minister
of foreign affairs because American decision is blocking "simple
idea" of this Frenchman who proposed to Macedonian government to
sit at the negotiating table with representatives of Albanian
extremists in Macedonia led by Ali Ahmeti because, according to
Bush, they are now "threat to peace, security and stability" in
the region. It is no longer important whether Leotard jumped
ahead, whether he wanted to be the first with new ideas or he
simply didn't know what was happening in Macedonia. In chess
terms, he made an opening mistake (together with the EU,
especially France which insisted on his appointment) and has let
others, apart from those who have appointed him, to determine his
area and target of his actions.
    So the EU has almost overnight spent all the days of
hard-working Javier Solana and other European ministers. EU cannot
reject just like that American political initiative so one should
explain last repentant statement of Swedish minister of foreign
affairs Anne Lind as presiding of the European Union in that
context. She said that people in Brussels made many mistakes with
Macedonian events and that those mistakes can be found as far back
as a year ago.
    So, even though war seems to be ending, now comes political
part of returning trust among ethnic groups in Macedonia. It
certainly cannot be easy, on the contrary it will be extremely
difficult, especially if one takes into account capabilities of
Macedonian politicians. The question is what will now say Arben
Djaferi, leader of the strongest Albanian party in Macedonia -
Democratic Albanian Party, and Imer Imeri, leader of the second
largest Albanian party in the country, Party of Democratic
Prosperity, who jointly with the leader of Albanian extremists Ali
Ahmeti signed declaration about Macedonian Albanians' rights? What
will say Macedonian prime minister and leader of the strongest
Macedonian party VMRO-DPNE Ljupco Georgievski who always favored
military resolution, putting mutual future of Albanians and
non-Albanians under question mark? What about leader of Liberal
Party and the president of Macedonian parliament Stojan Andov who
said that the idea of exchange of territories wasn't unacceptable?
    In other words, the international community now identified
reasons for Macedonian crisis, now Macedonia has to muster enough
courage and political prudence to finish its part of the job.

                          *  *  *

Bosnia and Herzegovina: ANOTHER LOST RACE FOR EUROPE
     By Radenko Udovcic
      Extradition of Slobodan Milosevic to The Hague Tribunal best
proved the rate of changes in the region of the southeastern
Europe and how strong the wish of individual countries to join
democratic community of Europe is. However, in Bosnia and
Herzegovina these processes have come to a halt for some time
and there is a threat that this country, although it is
practically under the international protectorate, will be the
last to enter the European integration processes. Changes of
governments happening in Croatia and Bosnia at the beginning
and end of 2000 have opened unimagined possibilities for the
democratization of the region. However, especially because its
national opposites, that were the reason for an extremely
strange constitution as set by the Dayton Accord, Bosnia didn't
manage to catch up with Croatia and Yugoslavia walks towards
the EU. Even with the disappearance of Milosevic's and Tudjman's
regimes that have been targeted by politicians in Sarajevo as
reasons behind all the bad things happening in Bosnia, Bosnian
national problems remained.
    The country and its leadership had to face the fact that the
two regimes were most directly responsible for the war in Bosnia,
but that the executors themselves as well as its protagonists came
from Bosnia, so that even new authorities in both entities
inherited opinions characterized by the nationalistic politics in
the last 10 years.
    A fierce blow to the entrance into EU was given by the Bosnian
parliament that recently refused to pass the new Election law,
which was set as one of the conditions for entrance of Bosnia into
the Council of Europe. This European institution set deadline for
June 26 for Bosnia to adopt the mentioned law; otherwise it
won't even take its membership application into consideration in
September. This election law is important because all post-war
elections were organized by the OSCE mission to Bosnia. Probably
faced with financial problems, but also wanting to finally set
Bosnia to its feet and make it take election issues into its own
hands, the international community proclaimed election law as the
key element for the whole entrance process into European
    As much as two years ago, an expert group of Bosnian and
international lawyers was formed. Under direct OSCE commands, they
made a bill of the election law. Immediately after its publication,
Bosniak representatives rejected its adoption saying that it was
definitely implementing national principles in Bosnia and division
of the country. On the other hand, Serbian and Croatian
representatives were generally satisfied with it, although they
had numerous objections to this proposal. However, since important
decisions in the parliament can only be passed with the consensus
of all three nations, and election law is definitely an example of
such decision, it wasn't ratified. Meanwhile there was a change of
government in Bosnia, but not big changes in government attitudes
towards basic state problems so that verdict on election law
stayed the same. After long sessions in specialized parliamentary
committees, there has been some small change implemented into law
that didn't basically change its substance . All were
characterized by fierce pressure of the international community,
which insisted that the law be adopted, especially by Bosniak side.
    It even set the deadline - June 26, to either adopt the law
or the entrance into Council of Europe will be prolonged for a
year and a half. If Bosnia doesn't enter Council of Europe in
September, it won't be possible in 2002 because that is the
election year and the Council of Europe ruled not to invite any
country into it during the election year.
    Council of Bosnian ministers, representing a kind of central
government, therefore offered mildly modified proposal of Election
law to parliament. Two days before the deadline set by the
international community, Bosnian parliament rejected the proposal
because of the opposition of Bosniak and multi-ethnic parties.
International representatives in Bosnia immediately said that
Bosnia has definitely made a step backwards and estranged itself
from European institutions. President of the Council of Ministers
Bozidar Matic, member of Social-democrat party (SDP) which voted
against the bill, resigned immediately because he promised
entrance into Council of Europe.
    What's in the law that so much bothers Bosniak
    Election law has some provisions that are not in accordance
with generally accepted European attitudes that every citizen has
passive election right and a possibility to be elected for any
state function. Election law limits it according to nationality
and place of residence. Only Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks, three
constitutional nations in Bosnia, have the right to be elected as
members of Bosnian Presidency (collective chief of state). So, it
means that members of other ethnic groups in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (for example Jew or Slovenian) couldn't be elected
for that institution, no matter how smart, bright and popular.
Also, according to election law, only a Serb from Serb Republic as
well as Croat and Bosniak from Federation can be nominated for the
Presidency. It means that neither Serbs from Federation nor Croats
or Bosniaks from Serb Republic enjoy that right. But, in Bosniak
eyes, much bigger problem is that only residents of the Serb
Republic who are mostly Serbs choose a Serb representative, while
Bosniak and Croat members of Presidency are chosen by citizens of
the Federation. More, voters in Federation will be able to vote for
only one candidate, so it is easy to guess that Croats will always
vote for a Croat, Bosniaks for a Bosniak. Bosniak representatives
say that election law is contrary to European democratic
conventions because of the limits imposed on passive election
    On the other hand, all Serbian parties as well as HDZ
representatives think that it is only logical that there is a
national election principle in a country equally composed of three
nations. Especially Serbian representatives insist that division
into entities, which causes such model of presidency members
election, is a consequence of a constitution which legalized it.
Serbs and most part of Croats agree that Bosniaks want to
influence elections of Croats and Serbs in Bosnian presidency due
to their number supremacy. They see it as a wish for unitarian
state and Bosniak domination in Bosnia. SDP, a multinational
party, is refusing such accusations, but its partner Party for
Bosnia and Herzegovina which was former partner of hard-liners
SDA led by Alija Izetbegovic isn't so persuasive in its denial.
    The international community explains such solutions with the
constitutional limits. "Maybe these solutions are conservative,
but we cannot change them because it would make them clash with
Bosnian constitution. In order to basically change election law,
we must change constitution, and there is not a minimum of
political will for it" - was repeating former chief of OSCE
mission to Bosnian Robert Berry, one of creators of the election
    But what is the most disappointing in the whole problem is
that after war, all elections were carried out according to the
Temporary election rules brought by the OSCE, with the same type of
elections as these now offered in the election law. So if election
law doesn't pass the voting, elections will be organized according
to those temporary election rules, without regard to who their
organizer will be. That is why resigning prime minister Bozidar
Matic said: "Parliament killed an ox for a pound of flesh".
    Explaining reasons for his resignation, Matic stressed many
times that he, too, was against some chaotic solutions in the
election law. But he also said that it was necessary to respect
constitution, which doesn't allow basic changes of election
rules. He also finds it unforgivable that Bosnia, as he said,
passed on the real chance to enter the Council of Europe.
    Matic's term as head of the Council of Ministers is definitely
soon to end. According to law that regulates the work of this
institution, every 8 months there is another person, from another
nation, appointed to the office of president. But, to evade all
speculations about reasons behind his resignation, Matic also
resigned from his other parallel function of finance minister.
Thus he clearly showed that he wanted to leave active political
leadership. But, his resignation caused a real shock, in
international circles as well as among SDP. Everyone is afraid
that this long-time successful manager and pragmatic politician
won't be adequately replaced and that functioning of the
government could meet some serious problems. Therefore no new
president was elected. The Alliance for Change, ruling coalition
with SDP as its member, proposed a new bill on the Council of
Ministers. According to this proposal, this council would be
transformed into a modern government, with one president during
whole government's term. If the law is passed, that office belongs
to Matic, on whom his party colleagues exert a huge pressure in
order to revoke his resignation. However, both this last bill and
demands for changes in the election law are deepening national
mistrust in Bosnia.
    Although these solutions make possible the state to function
better, which is ultimately a requirement for entrance into the
Council of Europe, it scares both Croats and Serbs because they
think that they could come under Bosniak domination. Although some
politicians had honest intentions to modernize Bosnia, there is
another group of those who use state efficiency as a cover for
imposing their own political visions.
    From some politicians in the Council of Europe could be heard
ideas to leave additional time to Bosnia to pass election law
(until the end of August). But even if that happened, it is hard
to believe that Bosnia would be admitted to that organization.
Because, election law is the most important, but it is only one
out of ten conditions for entrance into CoE. Many think that
Bosnia, with extremists' raging before renovated mosques and
corrupted officials, will have to wait a while before being
admitted. International representatives, especially OSCE, are
eager for the law to be passed not because they so much wish
Bosnia to join CoE, but because OSCE mission isn't capable of
organizing another elections.
    Bosnia has objective obstacles: first, it is constituted of
three nations whose representatives have contrary interests;
second, that fact caused creation of inefficient state with some
federative and confederate elements; third, national hostilities
and memories of war slow down return of trust among nations. And
it is that trust which could disperse all doubts in some laws that
cannot be passed which is the main public reason for Bosnia losing
its place with Europe.

                     *  *  *
     By  Paulyuk Bykowski
    "Soldiers in the Great Patriotic War [World War Two in the
Soviet Union-ed.], even if they did not know it, were the
successors to Christ-loving warriors of previous ages," Patriarch
of Moscow and All Russia Alexy II said at the ceremonial lighting
of the Temple of the Holy Resurrection in Brest on June 24.
    The visit by the head of the Russian Orthodox Church to the
Belarussian city of Brest, on the border with Catholic Poland,
took place simultaneously with Pope John Paul II's visit to nearby
Ukraine. The timing and proximity has led to speculations that
those coincidences were not a chance.  However, Fedor Povny,
chairman of the coordinating committee of the department of public
relations of the Belarussian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox
Church, disappointed journalists on the eve of the patriarch's
visit by saying that in 1996, at the time of the his first visit
to Brest Region, His Holiness the building of the temple and
promised to consecrate it after its completion.  In addition, the
Patriarch's trip was timed to coincide with the 60th anniversary
of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union and the 15th anniversary
of the Chernobyl catastrophe.
    Thus, Alexy II was only keeping old promises.  It's another
thing that the opening of the temple was intentionally timed to
the beginning of presidential campaigning in Belarus, but His
holiness cannot be blamed for that.  Alexander Lukashenko simply
held him to his word and tried to use the patriarch's visit to
boost his ratings.
    Speaking in Belarus about the synchronicity of his visit with
that of Pope's to Ukraine, the Patriarch said that his visit to
Belarus was planned much earlier than Pope's to Ukraine. "I
wouldn't want the visit of Pope John Paul II to Ukraine to
destabilize relations between Churches or nationalities," he said.
"We will watch the course of that visit closely."
    That was all bluster.  The visit of Alexy II has great
importance for Belarussian Orthodox Christians.  His Holiness was
rushed on June 23 straight from the airport to the Holy
Resurrection, where he consecrated sanctuary for the Cross of
Euphrosinia of Polotsk.  She was the granddaughter of the
legendary Polotskian knight Vseslav Charodei and the first women
canonized by the Orthodox Church.  Saint Euphrosinia is considered
the heavenly intercessor of Belarus.  The cross, made in 1161 on
her orders, is rightly considered one of the main holy artifacts
of the Belarussian people.  Sadly, the original cross was lost in
1941 during the evacuation of the museum in Mogilev but, after the
declaration of the independence of Belarussian Republic, the cross
was reconstructed.  The cross was taken from Polotsk to Brest for
several days for the Patriarch's visit and placed in the
consecrated sanctuary.
    On June 24, the Patriarch performed a service of high
consecration of the Temple of the Holy Resurrection and the
liturgy for opening a cathedral, which lasts two and a half hours.
"After sixty years, we still remember the unmatched feat of our
fathers and grandfathers who gave their lives to defend the
Fatherland.  This majestic cathedral will forever remind us of
their bravery and heroism," he said.  According to His Holiness
many centuries of influence of the Orthodox Church and other
religions was an important factor in the accomplishment of that
    President Lukashenko was present at that ceremony and
afterward he and the Patriarch together visited the new Guardians
of the Border memorial complex, dedicated to the border guards
who, 60 years ago, suffered the first blow from the Wehrmacht. The
Patriarch and president then proceeded to the Heroic Brest
Fortress memorial complex, where a memorial meeting was held.
The meeting concluded with a ceremonial march-past by the
soldiers from the Brest garrison.  Then the Patriarch and
president proceeded to the St. Nicholas Garrison Church inside the
fortress, which is now under reconstruction.  The Patriarch
consecrated the church and Lukashenko promised that, regardless
of the outcome of the presidential elections, the church would
be fully reconstructed by the Patriarch's next visit.

                     *  *  *

 Special addition: NEW AT TOL                  July 2, 2001
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    With Milosevic off to The Hague, Kostunica's disapproval of
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OUR TAKE: A Welcome Anticlimax
    With Milosevic off to The Hague, Kostunica's disapproval of
the extradition is at odds with the reaction of the people.
    Many critics and supporters in Yugoslavia and abroad described
the Serbian government's hand-over of former dictator Slobodan
Milosevic to officials of The Hague-based international war crimes
tribunal on June 28 as a great surprise. In reality, Serbian Prime
Minister Zoran Djindjic and his allies did what they had been
promising, first privately and then publicly, ever since the
tribunal indicted Milosevic on May 27, 1999. More specifically, a
number of Serbian government officials had explicitly said in the
days before the hand-over that the government would indeed send
Milosevic to The Hague, and soon. So why all the excitement then?
    Milosevic has been the main protagonist of many breathtaking
Balkan events since 1987, and nothing short of great drama seemed
to go well with him. But the hand-over and the legal and political
mechanics behind it were rather uneventful. Milosevic was handed
over in a transparent way by an independent-minded, competent, and
law-abiding government that chose the simplest legal route to do
what it had said it would do if forced. This time, excitement
occurred only in the form of expected excitement as the public at
home and abroad assumed Milosevic couldn't be carted off in a way
as ordinary as that. As such, the former strongman's transfer to
The Hague represents a welcome anticlimax in the long and
sickening drama.
    The expectation of excitement was also fueled by the rivalry
between Djindjic and Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica, who
has expressed a series of confusing views toward the tribunal.
Kostunica first dismissed the tribunal as a political court but
later modified his stance, saying he would support cooperation as
long as the Yugoslav parliament adopted legislation that would
regulate it. At the same time, it was clear that the parliament
would be unable to gather the necessary majority. Kostunica then
supported a federal government decree on cooperation with the
tribunal passed by a majority vote. Meanwhile, Kostunica was
trying to leave the public with an impression that he and his
party were in the business of handing Milosevic to the tribunal
against their own will.
    What is Kostunica's real position then? He is undoubtedly a
sincere Serbian nationalist who fears that a Milosevic trial at
The Hague tribunal will inevitably be seen as an examination of
the general Serbian conduct in the recent wars. Kostunica is smart
enough to know that the picture likely to emerge is not going to
be to his liking, so he was simply trying to stop or postpone its
publication. Kostunica's analysis is not necessarily wrong, but
is incomplete.
    He and his conservatives assume that the majority of Serbs are
also frightened by the ugly picture that will probably come out at
the Milosevic trial. But the prevailing mood in Serbian society
suggests that they are wrong. Generally, Serbs are not
enthusiastic about The Hague sifting through the recent past, but
at the same time, only a minority would let that unnerved feeling
stand between them and the future. Serbia wants the Milosevic era
to end once and for all, whatever it takes. In that sense,
Kostunica looks like a Milosevic hostage, lagging behind his own
electorate which still, on the whole, adores him as much as it
once adored Milosevic. Kostunica's falling behind was most obvious
when he addressed the nation on television hours after the
hand-over. He expressed his disapproval in a grudging fashion,
while the nation at large was already approaching the matter in a
cool, almost businesslike manner.
    His rival Djindjic was a few steps ahead. Although not many
are admitting it, the absence of a significant social or political
backlash suggests Djindjic has won the quiet admiration of many
Serbs for doing on their behalf what they knew needed to be done
one way or another.
    .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .
    -- Transitions Online - Intelligent Eastern Europe
    Copyright: Transitions Online 2001
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