Contents:
1. The Czech Republic: COMMUNISTS DELIVER BOMBSHELL
OF ELECTIONS
by Petruska Sustrova
2. Belarus: IS LUKASHENKO THE NEXT BELARUSIAN FREEDOM
FIGHTER
by Paulyuk Bykowski
3. DISPATCHES FROM CHECHNYA: OPTIMISM FOR IMPROVEMENT
IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE*
The Czech Republic: COMMUNISTS DELIVER BOMBSHELL
OF ELECTIONS
by Petruska Sustrova
The doors of polling stations
closed at 2 pm on Saturday, June 5 after elections held over the previous
two days. Shortly before midnight, the media informed Czech citizens of
the most likely composition of the lower chamber of the Czech Parliament,
the Chamber of Deputies. The Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD) was the
victorious party, receiving 30.2 percent of the vote. The Civic Democratic
Party (ODS) came second with 24.47 percent. But the great bombshell of
the elections was the third place showing by the Communist Party of Bohemia
and Moravia (KSCM) with 18.51 percent. The fourth party which managing
to overcome the threshold for entering parliament (5 percent for individual
parties and 10 percent a two-party coalition) was the Coalition, consisting
of two parties, the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party
and the Freedom Union. It received 14.27 percent of the total number of
votes.
Czech citizens were
able to choose from among almost thirty political parties and movements
and more than 12 percent of vote was cast for small and minor parties that
did not cross the threshold to make it into parliament. Only two were relatively
successful: the Association of Independent Candidates and the Party of
the Greens, which received
just enough, a little over 1.5 percent each, to qualify for financial
contributions from the state (one hundred crowns for each vote cast for
the party). President Vaclav Havel entrusted the chairman of CSSD, Vladimir
Spidla, with the formation of a new government on Monday, June 17. He must
now choose a partner and any of the new or old parties will create a majority
in the Chamber of Deputies. Even the mere 30 seats of the Coalition are
sufficient for the Social Democrats, with 71 seats, to form a majority
in the 200-seat Chamber. It would be a very slim majority in this
case.
Long before the elections,
Spidla had referred to the Coalition as the most attractive partner of
the Social Democrats in a future government. Spidla maintains this
view even now, after the elections, and has already approached Coalition
politicians with a proposal of forming a government together. This
is rather surprising since the Left is the clear winner of the elections
and under normal political customs the social democrats should form a coalition
government with the communists. This coalition would give a comfortable
majority of 112 seats.
But in looking for
a partner, Spidla has given preference to an approach that he sees as being
more important than the traditional left-right labeling, most importantly
taking the road of joining the European Union. While neither the communists
nor Klaus's Civic Democrats openly declare their disinterest in EU accession,
their systematically stated reservations and demands make it clear that
any government including their parties would complicate accession of the
Czech Republic to the EU.
Another serious problem
is the fact that the KSCM is seen as a party that never disassociated itself
from its totalitarian past and consequently is not an acceptable partner
for democratic parties. In the 1998 elections, it obtained 11percent of
all votes and considering pre-election polls a majority of observers did
not expect it to increase its vote very much. So what made Czech voters
cast their vote for a party connected with the communist regime?
First, only 58percent
of all eligible voters came out to vote in the elections (the smallest
percentage since 1989). Since the traditional voters of the KSCM are absolutely
reliable when it comes to going to the polls, this meant the KSCM could
expect better results simply by an overall lower turnout. In the Czech
Republic, there is a saying that, "Those who do not vote, vote for the
communists." This notwithstanding, the stronger position of the communists
in the Chamber of Deputies is not just an optical illusion from a lower
turnout; the communists had 200,000 more total votes than in the previous
election. Many observers, however, attribute the large KSCM vote to so-called
"protest" votes, and not due to the Czech citizenry's longing for a return
of communism.
There is another reason
that low turnout is linked to the communist party's success. Large sections
of the Czech public were sickened by politics during the past term of office.
The social democrats won the previous elections but did not find a partner
with whom to form a government, forcing the previous party leadership to
conclude a so-called opposition contract with Klaus's ODS. The agreement
stipulated that ODS deputies would not vote for the resignation of the
government, allowing the CSSD to remain a full four years in power despite
strong criticism.
The stable government
of the Social Democrats had some advantages: it succeeded in privatizing
banks and bringing the country out of its economic recession; it attracted
a large number of foreign investments and launched solid economic growth.
But in the eyes of the public, the contractual link of the CSSD with the
opposition ODS lessened the value of politics. Political programs and their
implementation did not matter and politics seen as merely a technicality
of power sharing.
Spreading corruption
was an inevitable consequence: if the CSSD was to satisfy its “opposition
contractual” partner, then CSSD and ODS deputies had to share out many
posts on the boards of enterprises where the state still owns asset shares,
as well as many posts in the state administration. This created the impression
among many citizens that for Deputies politics is no more and no less than
a lucrative sinecure and not a service to the public, and that by casting
their votes in elections the voters are unable to participate in decision-making
since the
political elite has turned into a kind of new nomenklatura sharing
power among its own members after the elections. It was this feeling that
clearly dissuaded many citizens from voting. In fact, almost one and a
half million fewer people voted in this election than in 1998.
Another factor that
might have helped the communists to achieve their considerable electoral
gains was the election campaign, which lacked specifics and was accompanied
by countless attacks and invectives. The CSSD's prime theme was “the defense
of national interests.” Milos Zeman, the Prime Minister, made several rude
and crude statements addressed to the Sudeten Germans who had been stripped
of Czechoslovak citizenship, deprived of their property after the Second
World War, and expelled from Czechoslovakia.
This so-called expulsion
had been accompanied by various acts of brutality, which have never been
punished since one of the decrees of the Czechoslovak President at the
time, Edvard Benes, assured the culprits of impunity. This Decree, together
with all other Decrees, which were the foundation of Benes's government
immediately after the war, subsequently became law under a decision of
the National Assembly. The justification of the expulsion and, above all,
the methods by which it was carried out were never discussed openly in
Czechoslovakia under communist rule. A statement by Vaclav Havel on television
in December 1989 that “we ought to apologize to the Sudeten Germans,” aroused
a widespread wave of antagonism among the public as well as among a number
of politicians. Ever since, there have been discussions from time
to time in the Czech media on the subject. Representatives of associations
of expellees in
Germany and in Austria demand the annulment of the Benes Decrees and
certain German and Austrian politicians support them. When in the spring
Prime Minister Milos Zeman called the Sudeten Germans Hitler's Fifth Column
in post-war Czechoslovakia and when he advised Israeli politicians to settle
their problems with the Palestinians by expelling them as Czechoslovakia
had done after the war, he aroused understandable irritation in German
and Austrian political circles.
The Sudeten German
question became a major theme in the Czech elections; the Czech Chamber
of Deputies even went so far as to adopt a unanimous decision according
to which the post-war territorial and ownership arrangement was irreversible.
It is worth mentioning that neither the German nor the Austrian state ever
raised territorial claims against the Czech Republic and that the political
representatives of these two countries repeated over and again that they
had no intention of ever raising such claims.
But “the defense of
national interests” which certain Czech politicians had made their crucial
theme triggered considerable alarm among the public, especially in regions,
which had been resettled after the expulsion of the German population.
This alarm was able to add a number of votes for the communist party since
the communists are traditionally anti-German and could well appear to be
the best protectors against an alleged threat.
• • •
Belarus: IS LUKASHENKO THE NEXT BELARUSIAN FREEDOM
FIGHTER
by Paulyuk Bykowski
Russian president Vladimir
Putin's “casual” speech on Russian-Belarusian integration on June 13, made
to an audience of medical personnel at Bakulev Cardiologic Surgery Center,
has destroyed the myth that the builders of the Belarusian and Russian
Unified State think alike. Questions were raised on this high level for
the first time, such as why Belarus will have a veto and why there will
be guarantees of its territorial integrity and sovereignty within the Unified
State.
The week began without
hint of the upcoming sensation. On June 10, Belarusian president
Alexander Lukashenko arrived in Saint Petersburg for a meeting with his
Russian colleague. While his host was busy with summits with the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Union of Baltic Sea States as well
as negotiations with the heads of Azerbaijan, Germany and Ukraine, Lukashenko
found his own way to keep busy. He played hockey against the St.
Petersburg team and won. Everything was as usual.
On June 11, summing
up the results of several hours of negotiations with Putin, Lukashenko
announced, “There are no irresolvable problems.” Moreover, the Belarusian
BELTA news agency quoted Lukashenko as saying that they had reached an
agreement that the Belarusians would present its views on the nature of
the union to take place, when a united parliament would be elected and
what type of document the whole affair was to be based on.
Lukashenko’s press
secretary Natalya Petkevich stated that, by the end of the first four hours
of the negotiations, Lukashenko had given Putin a letter with a list attached
of unresolved problems in Belarusian-Russian relations, among which were
indirect taxation, optimum conditions for the delivery of Russian uncut
diamonds, controls over cane sugar imports to Russia, the establishment
of a common transportation market, and natural gas shipment to Belarus.
Then there was a second
round of negotiations and Putin went boating on the Neva. Lukashenko
said that he was sure that “there will be no tactical problems between
Belarus and Russia.” Leonid Kozik, deputy head of the Belarusian
presidential administration, broke the news to journalists that Moscow
was about to take specific measures to alleviate misunderstanding between
the two sides. BELTA quotes Kozik as saying, “The thing is that the
Russian Federation, as a sovereign state, passed laws three to five
years ago placing Belarus on an equal footing with the other countries
of the world. Therefore, today we have to adjust them.”
Several days later,
his words took on new meaning. Nonetheless, everything appeared normal.
The integration machine, wound up under Boris Yeltsin, continued to shoot
out steam and rumble forward. On June 13, the Russian Central Bank
released the second tranche of credit, another 1.5 billion rubles of 4.5
billion promised last year.
Belarusian officials
were speaking warmly of the latest stage of integration, but only in the
first half of the day. Then Russian television showed Putin meeting
doctors at the Bakulev
Cardiologic Surgery Center. Somewhere between his visit to the
chief surgeon's office and the children's ward, Putin suggested that the
Belarusian leadership should define the mechanism for integration. And
everything changed.
“There should be no
legal wishy-washiness that we will then be unable to deal with,” Putin
said. “Our partners need to understand for themselves, to define
what they want. We often hear that it would be nice if it were something
like the Soviet Union. Then why write in the write in the proposed Constitutional
Act that there will be a sovereign state, territorial integrity, the right
to a veto on all decisions, and so on?”
The Russian president
spoke forthrightly about the unacceptability for the Kremlin of true equal
rights for the two countries in the Unified State, since that would not
be in the Russian interest. “Let's not forget that the Belarusian
economy is 3 percent the size of Russia's,” he said.
Nor does Putin agree
with the transfer of the Belarusian state “golden lot” into the Union State.
“Maybe there is a right to a veto if the leadership has established that
the people are opposed,” he said. “Then we should have the right
to a veto too. . . But then it is no longer anything like the Soviet Union.
It must be clear what we want and what our partners want.”
Putin also openly
denied the possibility of any “supra-Russian” agencies in the Unified State.
“Under no circumstances can any kind of supra-national organs with ill-defined
functions be created. We already had that in the history of this
country with the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and Russia,” which had no
“clearly assigned competences.”
Thus, the Russian
head of state decisively constricted the maneuvering power of pro-integrationists,
leaving only a choice between the status quo and the annexation of Belarus.
Political scientist
Viktor Chernov, commenting at the request of STINA, stated, “The Union
State will not be built on the Belarusian model. The subtext of Putin's
statements is that
Belarus will either join Russia as a constituent of the Federation
or else there will be no integration."
It is curious to note
how the Belarusian opposition reacted to Putin’s statements. The first
reaction of most of them was almost childlike happiness that the oppressor
was being offended. When the question of the implementation of Putin’s
demands in the unification process was raised, Belarusian political scientists
tried to speak in the most general terms.
The ruling party acted
similarly. Kozik was set under the spotlight and Lukashenko evaded
political self-immolation. A Belarusian newscaster read part of a
reproach addressed to Putin from Kozik, another part Kozik was allowed
to read himself. Putin's own words were not broadcast at all.
In this reproach,
reference was made to a search for the enemies of integration who set the
Russian head of state against the suggestions of the Belarusian leadership
in a sudden change of position. The newscaster put it this way:
“As the deputy head of the Administration said, ‘It is hard for me to answer
the question of who could plant the idea overnight that Minsk intends to
resurrect the great and powerful USSR, but I think that Vladimir Vladimirovich
[Putin] and all right-thinking people in both Russia and Belarus understand
very well that is impossible theoretically and even more so practically.’”
In his opinion, the Russian president’s pronouncements today were made
under the influence of the notes of the latest socialite political analyst,
who is trying, for the benefit of opponents of the Union State, to convince
the leaders of the State to emasculate the existing agreement, to render
it hazy and washed out and thereby unworkable.”
Could they really
be talking about Speaker of the State Duma Gennady Seleznev and leader
of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation Gennady Zyuganov, who
that very day criticized the Kremlin for its undesirable support of the
Belarusian proposal to create supranational organs within the Unified State?
Kozik made another
argument as well. “Just imagine,” he said. “Two presidents spoke
for nine hours, spoke in a businesslike, yet friendly, atmosphere.
I don't think that people who bear the mantle of high authority, heads
of state, would spend that much time together, more than nine hours, if
they didn't have a lot to talk about or, let us say, if they weren't nice
to each other or they didn't think that their states would live and develop
together.”
One Belarusian high
official compared the developments in Belarusian relations to a marriage
contract between spouses from different social strata-it's very hard, if
though both have the same goal of living together. Another commentator
made a similar comparison, but observed that nothing happens by chance
in politics.
Indeed, time has flown
since Russia has been recognized as a country with a market economy, thus
increasing its chances of joining the World Trade Organization. The
U.S. State Department's request that the Kremlin convince its Belarusian
allies to behave themselves increases the Department's dependence on the
Kremlin, as does Minsk's utter alienation from all international institutions.
It bears repeating that Belarus today has withdrawn itself to the greatest
extent possible from the very organizations Russia is attaining to.
One explanation for
the situation as it stands may be the West's hypothetical isolation of
Belarus in matters acknowledged to be the interests of Russia, and gentlemen's
agreements not to interfere in the inclusions of Belarus in the Russian
Federation in return for guarantees not to violate human rights.
In that case, at their
meeting in St. Petersburg, Putin could have offered his Belarusian “brother”
a deal he couldn't refuse, or accept.
Liberal Democratic
Party of Russia leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky roughly outlined the hypothetical
deal as Belarus joining Russia in the form of two provinces and the president
of the Republic of Belarus being given the post of first deputy prime minister
in the Russian government. More responsible politicians began to
shush him, without exactly refuting him. If there will not be supra-Russian
organs in the Union State, either there will be no Union State, or there
will be supra-Belarusian organs.
A deal like that will
not please Lukashenko. The relationship between lord and vassal can
be dressed up and renamed in many ways, but the vassal remains a vassal.
Anatoly Lebedko,
Belarusian opposition activist, said of Putin’s statements that the
only place left in politics for Lukashenko was as the head of a CIS anti-Putin
faction. Five years ago he had predicted that the Belarusian president
would have to form a partisan brigade to fight for Belarusian independence.
There are increasing
rumors of a referendum to be held in Belarus in the fall. They opposition
says that Lukashenko will use the tactic to extend his term in office.
If integration takes place without supra-national organs, the first question
on that ballot may be whether Belarus will be joined with Russia.
In that case, preserving a leadership role for Lukashenko will be a measure
to preserve Belarusian independence, at least for a time.
In August, the Belarusian-Russian
group to develop a Constitutional Act of the Union State is supposed to
present the fruits of its labors to the High State Council of the Union
State.
It is hard to imagine how they will reconcile the positions of Minsk
and Moscow. There is a precedent in Belarusian history for subjecting
two proposed constitutions to a referendum. At that time, the results
were determined by the Lukashenko-controlled media and Central Elections
Commission.
• • •
The Optimism for Human Rights Improvement in
Chechnya is Incomprehensible: The Situation in the
Chechen Republic in April-May 2002
The war in Chechnya
is being fought in a way that could continue for decades.
Landmines are still frequently set off in Chechen cities and villages,
killing both Russian soldiers and police, and also civilians – women, children,
and old people. Anytime this happens, Russian law enforcement responds
with harsh punitive operations directed against the entire civilian population.
The situation in the
Chechen Republic is deteriorating continually in all respects, despite
Moscow’s cheery announcements and the optimistic coverage by Russian television
news channels.
Some Western politicians are making baseless statements that
observance of human rights has improved substantially. In fact, the people
of Chechnya have are not only deprived of all civil and human rights, they
lack even the most basic of all rights – the right to life.
Terrorist acts directed
against the civilian population of the Chechen Republic have reached unprecedented
scope and methods. Because law enforcement agencies – most notably
the prosecutor’s office – are entirely non-functional, both street crime
and war crimes have are part of daily existence in Chechnya. The
growth of criminality in the Republic is staggering. Extra-legal
executions and other punishments have become the norm. Whereas earlier,
members of the Chechen militia and government were the targets, now nearly
every night people who are just socially active or civic leaders are being
killed. These targeted civilian killings have filled Chechen society with
fear and desperation.
Russia’s military leadership has long known that the tactics
associated with “inspection of the passport regime” are ineffective means
in subduing Chechen fighters. The inspections – better known as mop-up
operations – are nothing more than state-sponsored terrorism directed at
the Chechen people. They go hand in hand with theft, vandalism, and
bribery. More than 90 percent of those arrested during mop-ups have
no connection whatsoever to the independence fighters. Of those arrested,
the lucky ones are bought out of captivity by their families; they return
beaten, crippled and hardly alive. Frequently, however, the family
finds only a mutilated corpse, and is often forced to buy the corpses for
burial.
The formal military
doctrine governing the operation in Chechnya outlines a set of principles
regulating operations regarding the “inspection of the passport regime.”
Officially under doctrine, “passport inspections” are supposed to be under
strict administrative and legal control in order to prevent any human rights
violations. In fact, as soon as this doctrine was enacted, the violations
became more egregious. While in 2001, mop-up operations occurred
sporadically in various towns and villages in Chechnya, in 2002, multiple
operations have frequently been conducted in several areas simultaneously.
And in some areas (Grozny, Stariye Atagi, Argun, Urus-Martan, Alkhan Yurt
and Tsotsin-Yurt), mop-up operations are a regular occurrence. Each
operation targets dozens of people, and hundreds disappear without a trace.
Russian soldiers reserve a special sort of cruelty and sadism for the mop-up
operations, beating, torturing, and crippling innocent people.
Due to the work of Chechen human rights organizations, information
on these unprecedented human rights violations occurring during mop-up
operations in Chechnya has become available to people in Russia and to
the international community.
The Russian army has
been conducting regular mop-up operations in the town of Argun. Twice
in a short period of time, Russian troops attacked local schools.
School Number 4 was attacked on March 28, while students were on break,
and School Number 1 on April 10. According to administrators of School
Number 4, Russian troops approached them and claimed that they had information
that guerrilla fighters used the school basement as a hideout. There
was an explosion in the school, after which the soldiers began shooting
indiscriminately. Approximately 10 people were wounded in the attack
and a cow was killed. As the soldiers left the school grounds, they
continued to fire into the streets. A young boy who heard the shooting
tried to hide in a store, but the bullets penetrated the wooden door.
He was hit in both arms and both legs.
On April 10, troops arrived at School Number 1 in armored carriers
with the serial numbers blacked out. They broke into the building
and beat up a number of students in the gym, as well as attacking members
of the Chechen militia who were trying to protect the children. The
soldiers answered all questions with obscenities. Many students,
traumatized, did not return to school the next day.
According to Chechen
human rights organizations, on April 23 Russian troops conducted another
mop-up operation in Argun. By the end of the day, Ramzan Mazayev,
who happened to be walking near the train station, had been killed, and
several others were wounded. Russian soldiers arrived at the train station
in armored personnel carriers without serial numbers, surrounded a group
of men and tried to arrest them. In order to prevent the men from
running away, and to prevent bystanders from interfering, the soldiers
opened fire. Several people were wounded. Witnesses living
near the train station saw the troops fire on unarmed people. Ramzan
Mazayev, who was simply walking by, was seriously injured. Bystanders
begged to be allowed to help him, but in vain. Mazayev died on the
street amid dozens of witnesses. Some, watching from far away, saw
the soldiers place a grenade in Mazayev’s pocket, lay their guns down next
to his body and then film him with a video camera. Only then did
the soldiers leave the scene, leaving Mazayev and four wounded men lying
on the street along with the other men who were surrounded and shot at
for no apparent reason.
According to the public
press center in the city of Nazran (Ingushetia), on April 17, 2002, Russian
troops opened fire in the village of Vashindoroy in Shatoy region at 4:00
in the afternoon. Two sisters, ages 3 and 11, died, and their 9-year-old
brother was seriously wounded. The children were playing in their
yard when the shooting began. The boy’s relatives asked the troops
to take him by helicopter to the military hospital in Vladikavkaz, but
they refused. Instead, he was placed in the local hospital.
A Russian regiment
stationed in the village of Borzoy carried out the shooting. According
to residents, Colonel Tarasov had threatened the head of the Vashindoroy
village administration that he would shell the village on the previous
day. Residents believe that the colonel was simply making good on
his threat.
At the end of March,
a mop-up operation took place in Tsotsin-Yurt, after the murder of a local
Russian contract soldier, a man who had been particularly rude and cruel
in his relations with the local population. Villagers claim that
he was killed by a fellow soldier. Nevertheless, the day after the
murder, Russian troops surrounded the village. At that point, there was
an unexpected explosion. It turned out that a bomb had been planted
on a passing car. Ten Russian soldiers were injured, and one died.
Afterwards, as the villagers had feared, troops arrived from Khakala, Gudermes,
and from the military installment located between Oyskhara and Tsentoroy.
The mop-up operation was
particularly cruel, gathering up men and taking them to a makeshift filtration
camp on the outskirts of the village.
The detainees were
not only cruelly tortured, but also subjected to electric shocks by soldiers
mockingly suggesting that they “call up distant relatives.” Men returned
from this camp half alive; some had had their fingers crushed. Many
ended up at the camp more than once. A total of 280 people were detained.
The rest of the men in the village had been threatened with arrest, but
managed to bribe themselves out of it.
Soldiers broke into
private homes at night, searching down women in a vulgar manner and committing
vandalism and theft. Soldiers stole 13 carpets from one home. Three
houses were completely destroyed – one burnt down and two exploded.
Several people taken to the filtration camp never returned to
the village. Their relatives and village leaders are now looking
for them. In early April, the bodies of three men from Tsotsin-Yurt
were found near the village of Bachi-Yurt in Kurchaloy region. All
three had been brutally beaten.
In early May, a mop-up
operation – particularly vicious, according to witnesses – was carried
out in the village of Alkhan-Yurt. Several people were killed in
the operation, including women, who were killed with extreme cruelty.
They were beaten, tortured and cursed. Their dead bodies were horribly
mutilated; they had turned black from the blows.
The situation in the
city of Grozny remains very disturbing. Russian armed forces periodically
carry out mop-up operations in various neighborhoods. They arrest
innocents, most of whom disappear without a trace or return home beaten
and crippled. Russian troops regularly conduct raids in the city,
arresting anyone who does not have a Grozny residence permit. In
the end most people arrested during these raids are freed – usually for
a bribe – but some detainees have never been heard from again.
In addition to the
widespread mop-up operations, Russian troops also carry out so-called “address
checks” in every town and village in Chechnya. Every day dozens of
people, most with no connection whatsoever to the guerillas, are subjected
to address checks.
The mop-up operations
and other checks and raids constitute an act of ethnocide against the Chechen
people. These operations are destroying the population of men between
15 and 40 years of age. Without convicting them of any crimes, Russian
soldiers arrest and kill healthy, strong men and boys, claiming that they
are potential terrorists and guerillas.
The observance of
human rights in Chechnya is not increasing; in fact, the situation it is
deteriorating with each passing day. The optimism of international
organizations that are charged with observing the progress of human rights
protection in Chechnya is incomprehensible.
Perhaps the progress
will become more visible when the entire Chechen nation has been destroyed.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
* Written by correspondents in Chechnya, Dispatches from
Chechnya is distributed in English by the Institute for Democracy
in Eastern Europe (IDEE). For more
information about IDEE, its programs, and the situation in
Chechnya, visit the IDEE webpage at www.idee.org. To receive
Dispatches by email, please contact IDEE at [email protected]